


RAdm Mark L. Bristol, C-in-C Asiatic Fleet, and BGen Smedley D. Butler (center of picture), inspect the 10th Marine Regiment on 1 June 1928. The stay

Marine Corps Historical Collection of the 10th Marines in Tientsin was marked by "spit and polish" as exemplified by the high gloss on the gun's barrel.



Marine painter has completed applying camouflage paint on an armored tractor at the 10th Marines gun

USMC Photo 531864 park in Tientsin. Note the hand-crank at the front of the tractor used for emergency engine starting.



USMC Photo 528210

A French 75mm gun, showpiece of the 10th Marine Regiment in Tientsin. The original caption read: "'Sweet Adeline' No. 1 Gun-10th Regt, U. S. Marines, Competitive Exhibit, 23 Jan 1928."


Another inspection made of the 10th Marines in Tientsin, China: from left to right in front row, Col Harry Lay, USMC; MajGen Joseph C. Castner, USA,

showing the flag and "spit and polish" became of paramount importance. The 6th Regiment painted helmets shamrock green while bayonets and other metal equipment were nickel-plated or buffed.62 The 10th Regiment's correspondent to The Leatherneck reported in October, "Our liberty starts at 1 o'clock every afternoon and is up at midnight. Our liberty uniform is campaign hats, shirts, khaki trousers, field scarves and fair-leather belts. Solid comfort is our motto."

Then, as now, the artillery prided itself on the condition of its motor vehicles. In a friendly competition with the Light Tank Platoon, the 1st Battery was judged to have the best tractor, the 13th Battery the best G.M.C. truck, while No. 977 of the Tanks was ranked the best Mack truck. The panel of judges

the commander of U.S. Forces in China; BGen Smedley D. Butler, USMC; and LtCol Ellis B. Miller, USMC.

USMC Photo 515290





The reconnaissance car of the 6th Battery, 10th Marines in Tientsin. The stylized emblem with cross-

ed cannons identifies an artillery unit and apparently was used widely on 10th Marines guns and vehicles.

was headed by Major (later Commandant of the Marine Corps) Alexander A. Vandegrift, then the 3d Brigade B-3 (Operations Officer).⁶³

The facilities available at Tientsin varied somewhat from those at Quantico. The artillery's *Leatherneck* correspondent boasted: "We have here in the Tenth one of the Seven Wonders of the World, a gun shed 350 feet long, 50 feet wide and 16 feet high. There is not a nail in it. Just another Chinese puzzle." 64

Inspections, field meets, equipment displays, drill, and liberty were to occupy the 1st Battalion, 10th Regiment until the latter part of 1928. In September of that year the pleasant China duty started to wind down for the artillery. On the 15th, the 6th Battery was attached to the 6th Regiment while the remainder of the battalion was redesignated 1st Battalion, 10th Regiment, Composite Regiment. Three days later, the Composite Regiment, which included infantry as well as artillery, departed Tientsin to meet the Henderson for the trip from Taku Bar to Shanghai.

When the Composite Regiment left Shanghai on the *Henderson* on the 31st, it was attached for administrative purposes to MCB, San Diego. On arrival at San Diego on 31 October, the Composite Regiment was broken up and the troops went into barracks while awaiting further transportation. On the 26th of November, Major Vandegrift relieved Colonel Lay and led the newly redesignated 1st Battalion, 10th Regiment, Artillery on board the SS Mongolia for its trip to New York City and Quantico. The Mongolia docked in New York on 18 December and the troops were in their Quantico billets that evening. When reveille sounded the next day, the battalion had a new commander, Major James L. Underhill. Major Vandegrift had been transferred to HQMC upon arrival at Quantico.

The 6th Battery, with the 2d Battalion, 6th Regiment, was redesignated a unit of the Composite Battalion, 3d Brigade and sailed from Shanghai on board the *Chaumont* on 29 November. The Composite Battalion spent Christmas in Honolulu and arrived in San Diego on New Year's Day, 1929. On the 7th of January the 6th Battery was permanently attached to MCB, San Diego as 6th Battery, 75s.

In order to retain three firing batteries in the 10th Regiment organization at Quantico, the 4th Battery was reactivated on 1 February. Fortunately another unit at Quantico had taken over the post's heavy construction duties, and the 4th Battery was able to act as a firing battery for a change.

In August 1929 the battalion conducted a threeweek firing exercise at what is now Fort George G. Meade. Lieutenant General Underhill recalled in 1980 the beginning of the exercise:

When I took command of the regiment, with an eventful march over the road to Fort Meade to be prepared for, I discovered that in past such marches tractors had broken down or had been scattered over the roads for miles waiting for repair. Further, many tractor drivers had been completely done in during their many hours of pounding over the roads. It seemed to me that this sort of performance would give the Marine Corps a black eye.


To prevent this we not only trained gunners, but also trained practically everyone as motor mechanics and tractor drivers, including gunners, battery clerks, cooks and messmen, etc. Tractor drivers needed frequent relief.

When we left Quantico the first time, Colonel Frederic L. Bradman, chief of staff of the post, came to see our 0500 departure. He said he was sorry for me having to conduct that march and that he would come out in the afternoon to see what help he could arrange.

Colonel Bradman did come out. He took the road we had taken and did not find us. He back-tracked and took the old Telegraph Road. He did not find us and searched another road.

At 1700 he found us camped on the Ellipse in Washington where we had arrived at 1600. All vehicles were present except one tractor which had broken down and which came into camp by 1800.

A successful march to Fort Meade followed next day and the performance was repeated the next year.65



USMC Photo 524807 A 75mm field gun of the 3d Brigade is loaded on

board the USS Henderson at Tientsin, China. The brigade was returning from a one-year China tour.

The 10th Marine Regiment passes in review at Tientsin, as part of a full schedule of field meets, equipment displays, and drills. The extent of mechanization of artillery at this early date is readily evident. USMC Photo 531831





Marine Corps Historical Collection Marines bring ashore a disassembled 75mm pack howitzer. The pack howitzer replaced the French 75 which had served Marine artillery since 1918.

In December the Service and 4th Batteries were cadred, and their personnel were fed into the other batteries. In March 1930, a large draft from Marine Barracks at Philadelphia allowed the 4th Battery to "swell" to three officers and 33 enlisted, while a Parris Island graduation in April enabled Service Battery to rise over the 50 mark.

"Pack 75s" and Fleet Exercises

During the summer of 1930, the Marine Corps began replacing its old French 75mm guns (Model 1897) with the 75mm Pack Howitzer, Model 1923-E2. This Army-developed weapon was designed for use primarily as mountain artillery to replace old Vickers 2.95-inch mountain guns. The elderly French gun used by the Marine Corps since the end of the "Great War," was a fine piece, but experience had shown that a howitzer, capable of high trajectory fire, was more versatile. Some specifications of the "Pack 75" were:

Caliber	75mm
Length in Calibers	
Weight of Shell	. 15 lbs.
Maximum Range9,	
Maximum Effective Range	500 yds.
Weight of Piece	,305 lbs.
Maximum Elevation	degrees
Minimum Elevation	degrees
Traverse to Right of Midaxle	degrees
Traverse to Left of Midaxle 1.5	degrees

The weapon was designed to be capable of transport by pack mules in six loads. The heaviest load weighed 248 pounds, the lightest 210 pounds. A "Professional Notes" article in the Marine Corps Gazette reported:

In the experiments conducted at Quantico a complete section was landed from each boat without the aid of a ramp, assembled and placed in travel position, drawn 150 yards inland and laid for firing in an average time of thirteen minutes per section after the boats were beached. Ammunition was carried in Cole carts. The cart was put ashore empty and then loaded by hand from the boat. There are sufficient men in the section to manhandle the piece and cart and it was the opinion of the officers conducting the exercises that a single section, a platoon or the battery could land and support an attack for at least eight hours before the transport and maintenance sections of the unit would be required. It is not expected that such satisfactory results would be obtained in a landing through surf on a hostile beach; however, the test demonstrates the suitability of the pack howitzer for landing operations.66

Appropriations proved slim in the years to come due to the "Great Depression." It was not until the end of 1931 that an entire battery was equipped with the new weapon.

On 10 July 1930, the term "Regiment" was replaced by the word "Marines" in the naming of units. Thus the 1st Battalion, 10th Regiment became the 1st Battalion, 10th Marines. This designation for regiments has survived to this day, a manifestation of pride for Marines and a source of great confusion for journalists. The battalion departed for a three-week Fort Meade firing exercise on 4 September. Again, instead of stopping overnight at Haines Point, the battalion bivouacked on the Ellipse in the shadow of the Washington Monument.

After exactly two years in command of the battalion, Major Underhill was relieved by Lieutenant Colonel Andrew B. Drum on 13 November 1930.

In May 1931, the regiment and the entire Marine Corps was saddened by the tragic death in France of Brigadier General Robert H. Dunlap. After commanding the 11th Regiment in Nicaragua he had been promoted to brigadier general and, in 1930, received orders to attend the Ecole Superieure de Guerre in Paris. On 19 May 1931, while he and his wife were visiting an area in France where the peasants had built homes from caves, a hillside collapsed, sealing a French farmer's wife in one of the caves. General Dunlap unhesitatingly plunged forward to her rescue and was himself buried in the avalanche of rock and timbers. Twenty-four hours later, when they were dug out, the woman was alive.

She owed her life to the gallant Marine who had died covering her with his own body. Mrs. Dunlap was later presented a gold star to place upon the Navy Cross General Dunlap had been awarded for World War I service.

The firing practice in 1931 was held at Stump Neck, Maryland, from 30 June to 29 July. On the 1st of July, firing batteries became lettered, although for a short time thereafter they were designated by both letters and numbers; e.g., Battery A (1st).

Late in 1931 the 1st Battalion, 10th Marines was fragmented, with two firing batteries and the battalion commander deploying from Quantico. On 17 November, Battery A (1st) sailed on board the Chaumont from Hampton Roads. After stops at Port au Prince, the Canal Zone, and at Corinto in Nicaragua, the battery arrived at San Diego on 6 December where it was assigned to the Separate Infantry Battalion. This battalion was to participate in Grand Joint Exercise No. 4 held in the Hawaiian Islands area from 13 to 19 February 1932. After a practice maneuver at Oceanside, California (still a peaceful coastal town never dreaming of eventually having a huge Marine base and a full Marine division in its back yard) the battalion sailed on board the Henderson on 31 January for the exercise area. The Marines seem to have played a minimal role in the exercise. Battery A (1st) returned to San Diego on 27 February and headed back to Quantico on 3 April. Due to peacetime fiscal and personnel limitations, the battery was disbanded on 20 April.

Meanwhile, Battery B (4th) began an odyssey long to be remembered by its members. On 21 December 1931 the battery was redesignated Battery B (75mm Pack Howitzer) and became the first Marine battery to be entirely equipped with the new field piece. On the same date, the battery and Lieutenant Colonel Drum were temporarily attached to the 1st Battalion, 1st Marines, and Drum was designated as its commanding officer. The battalion, consisting of Companies A, B, and D and Battery B (75mm Pack Howitzer), departed Quantico on 10 January for Hampton Roads and the battleships USS Arkansas (BB 33) and USS Wyoming (BB 32). It was planned that the "seagoing" battalion would make a 10-week training cruise on board the battleships with stops in the Caribbean and on the west coast.67

Battalion Headquarters, Company A, and Battery B under Captain John F. Kaluf went on board the Arkansas while the other units drew the Wyoming. Both ships sailed 12 January for Charleston, South Carolina. The battalion's two-week stay in

Charleston was capped by a military review at Fort Moultrie on 25 January. Upon departing Charleston on the 27th, the *Arkansas* headed for the Mardi Gras celebration in New Orleans, while the *Wyoming* steamed for a similar celebration in Galveston. Judging from accounts in contemporary *Leathernecks*, an exceedingly good time was had by all hands.


Mardi Gras concluded, both battleships headed for Guantanamo where the Marines were to conduct shore training. Barely three day's worth had been completed when orders were received to transfer all Marines and their equipment to the Arkansas, which was then to steam to the west coast to take part in fleet maneuvers. The shift of personnel and back loading of ammunition and equipment was completed in 19 hours and the Arkansas headed for the Panama Canal. Turbine damage at Gatun Locks necessitated dry dock for the ship at Balboa, but permitted liberty for the troops in Panama City. The Arkansas arrived at Bremerton, Washington on 11 March to begin a six-week overhaul. Training areas for the Marines were limited, but they did manage to conduct rifle requalification on the Fort Lewis, Washington, range. Repairs complete, the Arkansas steamed for San Francisco and a rendezvous with the combined U.S. Fleet.

By late May 1932, the cruise of 1st Battalion, 1st Marines had achieved a permanence not envisioned earlier in the year. On 30 May, Lieutenant Colonel Drum was relieved and returned to his regular command at Quantico. Battery B (75mm Pack Howitzer) remained on board the Arkansas. On 1 November 1932, recognizing the fact that the "seagoing" battalion retained no real ties with either the 1st or 10th Marines, the Arkansas' battalion was redesignated the 1st Separate Training Battalion. The 1st Battalion, 10th Marines was reduced to one, skeletonized, noneffective firing battery. The 10th Marines' correspondent to Leatherneck wrote:

At this writing we are in the grip of the current depression, as we have been since the first of the year. We managed to have enough men here to keep the organization from going on the rocks. The situation is getting no better fast, ten men are to be paid off within the next three months, and, undoubtedly, there will be one or two more getting out before the winter is over. Replacements for this company are plenty hard to get.⁶⁸

In December 1932, the entire battalion consisted of nine officers and 26 enlisted men.

On the 1st of June 1933, Headquarters and Head-



USMC Photo 530891/BGen F. S. Robillard, USMC

A 155mm gun is swung over the side of the USS Antares (AG 10) during Fleet Exercise-1 at Culebra in 1935. The motor launch will pull the landing craft and gun to shore.

quarters Battery and Service Battery were merged into Headquarters and Service Battery. Lieutenant Colonel Drum was relieved on 9 July by Major Fred S. N. Erskine, former commander of the old 3d Battalion, 10th Regiment. Major Erskine was relieved in turn by Major Harold S. Fassett on 12 September. At the end of September Battery C was augmented by an additional 63 men and was able to conduct a firing exercise at Fort Hoyle, Maryland, from 3 to 13 October.

The Fleet Marine Force (FMF) came into existence on 8 December 1933 with headquarters at Quantico. It will be remembered that the mission emerging after World War I for the Marine Corps was amphibious in nature and offensively oriented. Hind-sight verified the wisdom of not becoming a professional "colonial" army. The last Marines left the last "banana war," Nicaragua, in 1933. Indeed, it was the release of these troops which enabled the formation of the FMF which in turn was to become the test bed for the amphibious doctrine then being written at Quantico and perfected in the Caribbean.

On 9 April 1934, the only remaining firing battery of the 1st Battalion, 10th Marines, Battery C, embarked on board the liner SS Northland at Quan-

tico and steamed for Norfolk and a rendezvous with the Chaumont. After stops at Guantanamo, Port au Prince, and Cristobal (Canal Zone), the battery transited the canal to Balboa on the Pacific side. There the battery joined up with their old friends in the 1st Separate Battery, 5th Battalion - the old 6th Battery left behind in Tientsin with the 6th Regiment in 1928 — which had sailed south from San Diego in the submarine tender USS Holland (AS 3). Battery C boarded the transport USS Argonne (AP 4) and sailed back through the canal for Culebra and Exercise M, Fleet Problem XV. After the exercise was terminated on 10 May, Battery C sailed to Guantanamo with en route stops at Ponce in Puerto Rico and Gonaives in Haiti. Transferring to the Arkansas at Guantanamo, the battery was back at Quantico by 22 May.

On 1 July two new batteries were formed: Battery A equipped with 155mm guns and Battery B equipped with .50 caliber machine guns. By the end of September both were sufficiently organized and outfitted to permit a live fire exercise. Boarding the supply ship USS Antares (AG 10) at Quantico on the 25th, they moved to Hampton Roads and subsequently to Fort Monroe, Virginia. Firing at the Army's coast artillery post on Old Point Comfort occupied the batteries until 21 October.

The entire battalion was back on board the Antares on 15 January 1935 and, augmented by engineer, aviation, quartermaster, and paymaster detachments, headed for Culebra and Fleet Exercise No. 1 (FLEx 1). Headquarters Company, 5th Marines and 2d Battalion, 5th Marines followed four days later in the Wyoming. Last to depart the United States was FMF commander, Brigadier General Charles H. Lyman, and the 1st Battalion, 5th Marines on board the Arkansas. For the Marines, the emphasis during FLEx 1 was more on training ashore than on the problems of ship-to-shore assault. The Navy, as always when in Culebra waters, exercised ship guns. The field artillery training of the 10th Marines was conducted as a separate training objective and not in conjunction with, or in support of, the infantry.

While back home the country was in the grips of a record cold snap, the Marines held swim call, acquired magnificient suntans, and enjoyed cold beer at an "outrageous" 25 cents a bottle at the many cantinas that had sprung up outside Camp Ildefonso. On 22 February, the task force hauled anchors and steamed for an eight-day liberty call in Cristobal before returning the Marines to Quantico.

While the 1st Battalion, 10th Marines was training in the Caribbean, the 2d Battalion, 10th Marines was being formed at San Diego. On 1 February, the 1st Separate Battery, 6th Marines, FMF (the former 6th Battery, 10th Regiment and former 1st Separate Battery, 5th Battalion) was redesignated Battery D (75mm Pack Howitzer), 2d Battalion, 10th Marines. On the same date Headquarters and Service Battery and Battery E (75mm Pack Howitzer) were formed. Major Nettekoven, the 1st Battery commander in China, was designated battalion commander. 69

April Fools' Day was the occasion of an artillery "musical chairs" at Quantico. Battery A (155mm Gun) became Battery G; Battery B (.50 Caliber Machine Gun) became Battery H; Battery C (75mm Pack Howitzer) became Battery A; and a new Battery B (75mm Pack Howitzer) was organized. On 1 June, matters were simplified when Batteries G and H were transferred to the newly formed 1st Battalion, Base Defense Artillery. This move left the 1st Battalion, 10th Marines with a Headquarters and Service Battery and two 75mm pack howitzer firing batteries.

At this point, while there were two battalions in the 10th Marines organization, there was no regimental Headquarters and Service Battery and no regimental commander as such. Each battalion operated totally independent of the other, a continent apart. For this period, the senior of the two battalion commanders has been listed as "regimental" commander.

Battery G, 1st Battalion, 10th Marines at loading drill in April 1935 at Quantico. Guns were nicknam-

Mid-1935 was a busy period for both battalions. The 2d Battalion embarked in the battleship USS Utah (BB 31) on 29 April and steamed to Midway Island, as part of the force participating in Fleet Problem No. 16.* The 1st Battalion, 6th Marines and Headquarters Company, 6th Marines rounded out the Marine contingent. The FMF units were commanded by General Lyman who had shifted his flag from Quantico to San Diego just in time to go on another exercise. Naval units involved, in addition to the Utah, included two destroyer divisions, a tender, two cruisers, and the aircraft carrier USS Lexington (CV 2).

The combined force arrived off Midway on Saturday, 11 May, and the Marines carried out the amphibious assault using motor launches from four of the ships. The objective, Sand Island, was "secure" by sundown and the Fleet Marines spent the next 12 days organizing defenses.

In June, the 1st Battalion initiated a relationship with the Army at Fort Bragg in Fayetteville, North Carolina, which remains in effect to this day. On the 16th, the battalion left Quantico and motored south

*The 1935 exercise was not the first time Marines had visited the lonely speck of land so aptly named Midway. In 1904 Marines began a four-year tour when a detachment under 2dLt Clarence S. Owen was sent to maintain order among unruly Japanese employees of the Pacific Cable Company, which was building a relay station for its trans-Pacific line.

ed by their crews: from left to right, "Mae West," "Popeye," "Big Bad Wolf," and "Tarzan."

USMC Photo 529212





USMC Photo 522188

Artillerymen from Battery B repel "Confederates" during the 1936 reenactment of the first Battle of Manassas. Battery B played the role of "D" Battery, 5th Artillery, U.S. Army.

for an eight-day firing exercise. The battalion's stay was capped with a beer party and picnic with the Army's 17th Field Artillery, Colonel Dunlap's old regiment in France.

The 1st Battalion, 10th Marines was attached to the 1st Brigade, FMF on 1 September. It was not until 1 July of the next year that the 2d Battalion, 10th Marines was attached to the 2d Brigade vice Marine Corps Base, San Diego.

Both battalions were active in January 1936. The 1st Battalion embarked in the familiar Antares for Culebra and FLEx-2 on 4 January. The artillery debarked on the 11th and immediately began construction of Camp Ellis, a tent city at Cemetery Cove, Great Harbor. The remainder of the force arrived soon afterwards and 13 January was designated as D-Day. The exercise, which involved ship-toshore training, brigade in the attack and defense, camouflage exercises versus aerial reconnaissance, and live fire of all weapons lasted until the 18th. One specific result of FLEx-2 was the recommendation that assault transports be built and earmarked for the FMF. The ships then currently in use as transports had insufficient troop space and organic landing boats, a fact amply demonstrated by the exercises.70

Once again Marines enjoyed Saint Thomas and San Juan liberty while subzero weather plagued the continental United States. The 1st Battalion, 10th Marines reembarked in the *Antares* on 15 February, arriving at Quantico by the 22d.

On the west coast, the 2d Battalion spent from 6-30 January at Plaster City, California, near El Centro, conducting annual firing practice.

The 1st day of June was the occasion of a 2d Battalion change of command with Major William H. Harrison relieving Major Nettekoven. The 1st Battalion followed suit on 29 July; Lieutenant Colonel Thomas E. Bourke relieved Lieutenant Colonel Fassert.

From the 17th to the 21st of July, the 1st Battalion provided personnel and howitzers for the 75th anniversary reenactment of the 1st Battle of Manassas or Bull Run. Before a large crowd, and accompanied by a running commentary from famed Civil War historian Douglass Southall Freeman, the Marines from Quantico helped put on a spirited and meticulously timed reenactment. Battery B recreated the part played by the old "D" Battery, 5th Artillery, US Army.

Both battalions were joined by young officers returning from Artillery School in July. In the 1st Battalion, First Lieutenant Alpha L. Bowser, Jr., later lieutenant general and Commanding General, FMF, Atlantic, relieved Second Lieutenant Leonard F. Chapman, later 24th Commandant of the Marine Corps, as executive officer of Battery A. On the west coast, First Lieutenant Donald M. Weller, later to become the commander of the 10th Marines and still later a major general, took over as executive officer of Battery E.

The men of both battalions received a workout during the next three months. In August, the 2d Battalion spent from the 8th to the 19th firing on San Clemente Island, one of the Santa Barbara group and home of goats, abalone, and the spectacular five-tree "San Clemente National Forest." Both direct and indirect fire was executed, giving all members of the battalion from gunner to observer good practice.

The 1st Battalion conducted its annual firing practice at Pennsylvania's newly established Indiantown Gap Military Reservation. On 15 September, the battalion departed Quantico by train, armed with old French 75s which had been laid up in warehouse ever since the issue of the new pack howitzers. This appears to have been purely an economy move. Depression-era appropriations were slim and there

was still a large amount of old French 75 ammunition on hand. While the observers could continue to receive fruitful training, a burst is a burst, this was not necessarily the case with the gunners. The sights for the French 75 were entirely different from those on the pack howitzer. The training problems were obvious. Lieutenant Bowser and a Battery A gunnery sergeant tried to remedy the situation by machining a mount for the howitzer's panoramic sight which would fit the French gun. Everything was fine until the gun was fired several times and the ensuing recoil destroyed the sight. Lieutenant Bowser later recalled, "I nearly got locked up for this little experiment."

The battalion enjoyed Indiantown Gap. It was a new place to train, a factor as appreciated in 1936 as today. The ranges featured rolling terrain, numerous targets, and several good gun positions. As a bonus, the Grand Hotel in nearby Lebanon became a favorite liberty spot. On 2 October, the battalion entrained for Quantico.

Lieutenant Colonel Lloyd L. Leech relieved Major Harrison as commanding officer of the 2d Battalion on 5 September, and, on the 29th, led it to Camp Kearny, California, for a two-week artillery practice. FLEx-3 was held on the west coast in 1937 from 27 January to 10 March. The 1st Battalion, 10th Marines was not included in the 1st Brigade troop list due to fiscal restraints and scarcity of shipping but the 2d Battalion did participate, embarking on board the stores ship USS Bridge (AF 1) on two occasions. FLEx 3 was the first joint Army-Navy-Marine Corps amphibious exercise. The U.S. Army 1st Expeditionary Brigade took part embarked in the USAT St. Mihiel. The 1937 exercise featured a parachute drop for the first time, as well as the first shore bombardment in support of attacking troops during a FLEx.

Although the 1st Battalion was missing out on the annual FLEx, it was busy. On 20 January, most of the battalion participated in President Franklin D. Roosevelt's second inaugural parade. The Nation's Capital provided traditional inaugural weather. The battalion's Headquarters and Service Battery Leatherneck correspondent wrote:

The weather man predicted beautiful weather. We hit the hay the night before with anticipation as we pictured ourselves marching grandly down Pennsylvania Avenue, buttons gleaming in the sunlight, our heels clicking on the dry, hard pavement, and all our uniforms and equipment radiating the effects of Blitz cloths, shoe polish, and the pressing iron. What a liar that weather man was, for we awoke the following morning at the prompting of a squall-

ing bugle to hear, not the soft misty drizzle of a nice rain, but the discouraging, pounding, slamming pour of a rain that from all indications meant to last indefinitely, and to do damage all the time it lasted. We were wet before we reached the train. We got wetter after debarking from the train in Washington.⁷²


As if the rain did not provide enough discomfort, Battery A reported in the same issue, "The Army boasts of being recently completely mechanized, but from our position in the parade there was much evidence that horses are still in use."

In mid-February, Lieutenant Colonel Bourke received orders from HQMC to form a detachment to be the President's guard at Warm Springs, Georgia. The majority of the 72-member detachment were handpicked men from the three artillery batteries. The detachment was inspected by Quantico's commanding general, Major General Lyman, and departed for Georgia on 4 March. The President arrived on 12 March, beginning his two-week stay. Security was the primary detachment duty, as it remains today at the Presidential retreat at Camp David, Maryland. The Marines did their duty well. After the chief of the Secret Service himself was challenged and made to produce his badge one night, all the Secret Service men were sure not to be without theirs. President Roosevelt was, as always, a great fan of the Marine Corps. It was while he was Assistant Secretary of the Navy in 1918 that he authorized, for the first time, the use of the emblem on enlisted uniforms in recognition of the Belleau Wood victory.

During his stay, the President reviewed a formal guard mount followed by a bayonet demonstration and then shared the noon meal with the detachment in the Marines' mess hall. Warm Springs duty was a highly prized and sought after assignment.

One month after the Marines left Georgia for Quantico, 26 April, the artillery traveled to Petersburg, Virginia. There, in conjunction with elements of the 5th Marines, the VMI Corps of Cadets, and the Virginia National Guard, the artillery helped re-create the famous Civil War battle of the Crater.*

^{*}In the original battle of 30 July 1864, Union troops from LtCol Henry Pleasants' 48th Pennsylvania tunneled under a Confederate battery facing the Union lines. In this tunnel was placed 320 kegs of black powder totaling four tons. The last 38 feet of tunnel was refilled to tamp the charge. The resulting crater measured 170 feet long, 60 to 80 feet wide, and 30 feet deep. The initial Union division to head into the breach faltered. Successive Union divisions were called into play but were hammered by Confederate artillery. The attack failed.



Camp A. W. Johnson, Culebra, shown in overview during Fleet Exercise 4-13, January-March 1938. The

camp was named after the rear admiral commanding the naval training squadron.

The Marines, in their customary position on the losing side of these historical re-creations, played the part of the Union forces before a crowd of 50,000 highly partisan Virginians. One artilleryman, Sergeant John Fogley of Headquarters and Service Battery, received much attention from the press when it was learned that both his father and uncle had fought in the original battle.⁷³

Major Harrison became the Commanding Officer, 2d Battalion, 10th Marines for a second time when he relieved Lieutenant Colonel Leech on 24 May 1937.

Both artillery battalions conducted annual service firing at midyear. The 1st Battalion left by train for Parris Island on 31 May and spent the next 25 days training not only battalion personnel but also officers from the Marine Corps Schools. Parris Island was not as well appreciated as Indiantown Gap had been the year before. Privately owned vehicles were not permitted as in years past so it was difficult "to arrive at a town before the streets are hauled in." The mosquitos, red bugs, sand fleas, and horse flies were savage and the nearest town, "Beautiful-Beaufort-

by-the-Sea," had nothing to compare with Lebanon's Grand Hotel. ⁷⁴ It was with much anticipation and not a little relief that the battalion boarded the train for Quantico on 26 June.

The 2d Battalion conducted its annual service firing at familiar Camp Kearney from 21 June to 15 July. On 22 July, the battalion was detached from the 2d Brigade and transferred to MCB, San Diego. The brigade was heading for China, but without the artillery. On 29 August, Headquarters Company, 2d Brigade and the 6th Marines boarded the Chaumont and departed the United States. The war between the Japanese and Chinese was threatening the International Settlement at Shanghai and the 4th Marines needed help. The 2d Brigade remained in China until February of 1938. The 4th Marines remained until just before World War II when it was transferred to what was hoped to be a place of safety but what turned out to be its place of capture, the Philippines.

FLEx-4 was held in the Caribbean from 13 January to 15 March 1938. The 1st Battalion, 10th Marines was among the units embarked in the *Antares* at



A 75mm pack howitzer battery is displaced in the gully between the railroad tracks and "Cinder City"

at Quantico. Wooden wheels of the howitzers later were replaced by pneumatic tires for better mobility.



The 75mm pack howitzer battery shown in the previous picture is prepared to move out. Note that

USMC Photo 529213 the trail of the gun has been removed and strapped to the barrel for transit.

Quantico on 12 January. After a two-day layover in Norfolk, a naval attack force consisting of the Antares, gunnery training ship Wyoming (AG-17) and the battleships Arkansas and New York (BB 34) as well as a destroyer and a submarine squadron sortied for the Caribbean. Arriving at Culebra on the 21st, the landing force disembarked and went into Camp A. W. Johnson, named in honor of the rear admiral commanding the training squadron.

The landing force conducted combat firing and unit training ashore before making practice landings on Culebra. On 7 February, the Marines reembarked in the Antares for a landing on the nearby island of Viegues, Puerto Rico. The Viegues Defense Problem lasted a week and was followed by 10 days of port visits at San Juan and Saint Thomas. The third phase of FLEx-4 involved a landing on the southern coast of Puerto Rico near the city of Ponce which was opposed by one Regular Army and two National Guard regiments. The assault was launched an hour before daylight, a feat difficult to execute even today. This final landing was judged a success and forcefully illustrated the need for the rehearsal phase of an amphibious operation.75 After another short visit to the port of San Juan, the amphibious task force steamed north; the Marines returned to Quantico on 14 March.

Two days before the 1st Battalion arrived back at its base, the 2d Battalion, 10th Marines embarked in the Utah for Fleet Problem XIX to be held in Hawaiian waters. Emphasis was placed mainly on naval evolutions and the problem play ashore was minimal. The battalion was back at San Diego on 13 April, but when it returned the battalion had one more firing battery than when it departed. Both 10th Marines battalions were authorized an additional battery on 20 March. At Quantico, Captain Saville T. Clark, later a wartime and postwar commander of the regiment, assumed command of Battery C. Onboard the Utah, Second Lieutenant (later Lieutenant General) Richard G. Weede found himself commanding Battery F, then consisting only of himself and Private Howard S. Wotring.⁷⁶

Four days prior to departure for Parris Island and annual firing practice, Lieutenant Colonel Bourke was relieved by Major (later Brigadier General) James D. Waller. The first two weeks at Parris Island were spent training Marine Corps Schools officers who functioned as battery officers. During the last two weeks, the batteries functioned under their own officers. The cannoneers retained their low opinion of the area's liberty potential. Two days after return to

Quantico, Lieutenant Colonel (later Brigadier General) Raphael Griffin reported aboard relieving Major Waller. From 19 September to 6 October the battalion, along with other Quantico units, was bivouacked at Camp R. P. Williams located at Brentsville, Virginia, five miles north of Quantico's present Camp Upshur.

The 2d Battalion spent 6 June-15 July 1938 engaged in training at the newly designated Camp Tarrant, U.S. Fleet Training Base, San Clemente Island.

The 1st Battalion embarked in the battleship USS Texas (BB 35) on 12 January 1939 at Hampton Roads for the annual landing exercise, FLEx-5. Nine days later, the battalion disembarked at Vieques where it trained until the 31st. On that date the battalion, minus Battery A which stayed behind to build Camp Little, boarded the Texas for landing exercises at Culebra and port visits at Trujillo City in the Dominican Republic, and Saint Thomas. Upon the return of the Texas from port visits, the battalion, still minus Battery A, went into camp on Culebra. After several weeks' training and another landing problem, the battalion reembarked in the Texas, stopped by Vieques to pick up a grateful Battery A, and headed home.

The 2d Battalion also found itself involved in camp construction during the spring of 1939. From 20 to 31 March the battalion was hard at work on Camp Nimitz, San Clemente Island. Major Harrison was relieved on 14 April by Major John B. Wilson, and three days later the battalion was carried back to San Clemente to participate in a series of minor landing exercises. No troop transports were available for the lift so the heavy cruisers USS Chester (CA 27) and USS Vincennes (CA 44) along with the battleships USS Arizona (BB 37) and USS Oklahoma (BB 35) were pressed into service. These landing exercises lasted until 4 May, at which time the battalion turned to howitzer practice. On 8 June, the Antares and the minesweeper USS Robin (AM 3) returned the battalion to San Diego.

The 1st Battalion, 10th Marines spent its third consecutive year at the artillery range at Parris Island from 9 to 29 May. During August 1939, all firing battery commanders and selected enlisted men spent four days onboard the converted destroyer USS Manley (DD 74) in connection with surf landings off the Virginia Capes. The Manley was an old, flush-decked, four-stack, World War I destroyer which had been modified as a fast troop carrier. Despite war on the horizon and a Marine Corps irrevocably committed to the amphibious assault, no standard

type landing craft existed. While this was a serious problem for the infantry, it was an almost prohibitive consideration for the heavily equipped artillery. Help was on the way from New Orleans boatbuilder Andrew J. Higgins, inventor of the craft which became the standard for World War II invasion beaches. In 1939, however, the Marines still experimented with everything in sight.

On 1 September 1939, Germany invaded Poland. Two days later, France, Great Britian, and the British Commonwealth declared war.

San Clemente Island was the site of the 2d Battalion's 1939 annual service practice from 7 to 28 September.

FLEx-6 got underway on 8 January 1940 when the landing force boarded assigned shipping at Norfolk, Virginia. Seven days later the 1st Battalion, 10th Marines went ashore from the Wyoming at Culebra. Two captains who were destined to command the regiment in later years were battery commanders at that time; Captain (later Major General) Donald M. Weller, Battery A; and Captain (later Lieutenant General) Robert B. Luckey, Battery C. Of all the batteries, Captain Luckey's enjoyed the most variety during the exercise. In February it took part in both the Vieques landing exercise and Brigade Landing Problem 1, as well as the final exercise landing on Culebra in early March. The battalion reembarked in the Wyoming on 7 March and was back at Quantico six days later.

Annual service practice was held, once again, at Parris Island. The artillery entrained for Parris Island on 18 April and returned to Quantico on 20 May. On 3 June, Lieutenant Colonel Griffin was relieved by Lieutenant Colonel Galen M. Sturgis.

In Europe, the British Expeditionary Force completed its evacuation from Dunkirk on 4 June leaving Adolph Hitler and the Third Reich the unopposed masters.

The United States girded for war. President Roosevelt had already declared a limited national emergency in September of 1939 authorizing, among many other things, a 33 percent increase in the enlisted strength of the Corps and a recall of retired officers and enlisted men. It was obvious that such an expanded Marine Corps would require an equally increased field artillery capability. Accordingly, on 1 September 1940, the 1st Battalion, 10th Marines was redesignated the 1st Battalion, 11th Marines. Two months later, the 1st Battalion, 10th Marines was reconstituted at San Diego under Lieutenant Colonel Louis G. DeHaven, the former

executive officer of the 2d Battalion. Many of the personnel in the new battalion were Marine reservists from the 22d Battalion (Artillery), which had been called to active duty on 1 November. The battalion was armed with old French 75mm guns, due to a shortage of pack howitzers.

On 27 December, for the first time since 1927, the 10th Marines became a true regiment. On that date a regimental Headquarters and Service Battery was organized at San Diego and Colonel Thomas E. Bourke was appointed regimental commander.

New Year's Day, 1941, saw the formation of the 3d Battalion, 10th Marines under Captain (later Brigadier General) John S. Letcher. The 3d Battalion's firing batteries, G, H, and I, were equipped with French 75s. It would be months before increased production would allow the Marines to retire the French guns for good.

The 1st and 2d Battalions moved to the newly established Camp Elliott on Kearny Mesa outside San Diego in mid-January. All available space at San Diego itself was needed for the rapidly increasing recruit load. The 3d Battalion followed its sister units to Camp Elliott in April. To provide the 2d Marine Division (the 2d Brigade had been so designated on 24 January 1941) with heavy artillery, the 4th Battalion, 10th Marines was organized on 11 April. The battalion had two 155mm howitzer firing batteries, K, and L, under the command of Major Ralph E. Forsyth, and was armed with old World War I French Schneider howitzers.

Sojourn in Iceland

During the spring of 1941, with Hitler dominant in Europe and on the offensive in North Africa, great concern was voiced in Washington over the Portuguese Azores. If Hitler was successful in negotiations with Spain's Francisco Franco, whom he had supported with men and weapons during the Spanish Civil War, then the road to Portugal lay open. In February, the British asked the United States to assume the defense of the Azores if necessary. The War and Navy Departments were ordered to prepare the required landing and occupation plans. On 29 May, the plan was approved by the Joint Board. It called for a landing force of 28,000 men; half Marine, half Army. Marine Major General Holland M. "Howling Mad" Smith was to be the commander and the 1st Marine Division comprised the Marine component.77

Due to the cadre status of many 1st Division units, the decision was made to reinforce it with a west coast, 2d Division regiment. The 6th Marines, commanded by Colonel Leo D. Hermle and reinforced by the 2d Battalion, 10th Marines, among other units, sailed from San Diego on 31 May. As the Marines sailed south to the Panama Canal on board the transports USS Heywood (AP 12), USS Fuller (AP 14), and USS William P. Biddle (AP 15), the situation regarding Spain and the Portuguese Azores changed for the better. The President cancelled plans for the landing, but the 6th Marines kept sailing toward the east coast. Another island was in their future.

The year before, the British, acting in an understandable but none the less unilateral fashion, had occupied Iceland a month after the German occupation of Denmark. The Royal Marine landing force was relieved by a Canadian Army brigade which, in turn, was reinforced and then replaced by British Army units. As the British suffered defeat after defeat, the occupation forces on Iceland represented a major manpower burden. In late spr-

A group of British Army and U.S. Marine Corps officers observe the operations of a Marine 75mm pack howitzer crew during the Marines' occupation of

ing of 1941, Winston Churchill asked the U.S. to relieve the Iceland garrison and President Roosevelt, on 4 June, ordered the Army to prepare a relief plan. The Army found itself in considerable difficulty trying to muster a large enough force in the scant time allowed. Then-existing laws prohibited sending draftees and National Guardsmen outside the Western Hemisphere. The Marines, all volunteers, were not subject to this restriction. The next day, the President decreed that a Marine brigade be prepared to sail in 15 days. The 6th Marines (reinforced) was chosen as the nucleus for this brigade and ordered to Charleston, South Carolina. At Charleston, the brigade was met by Brigadier General John Marston, the brigade commander; the 5th Defense Battalion from Parris Island: engineers, scout cars, and chemical troops from the 1st Marine Division at New River, North Carolina; and cold weather clothing from Sears, Roebuck and Company. The Marines sailed on 22 June, spent five days anchored at Argentia, Newfoundland, waiting for the Icelandic Government to be persuaded to "invite" the occupation, and arrived at Reykjavik on 7 July.78

Iceland. Two antiaircraft, 50-caliber heavy machine guns can be seen mounted on the truck in the background.

USMC Photo 524206



The British were overjoyed to see the Marines. Their commander, Major General H.O. Curtis, presented the brigade with the highly prized British polar bear shoulder patch and generally did what he could to help the Marines settle in. Unfortunately for the Marines, Iceland was a terrible place to be stationed. The weather was foul; training opportunities were scarce; working parties were unending; and liberty was next to nonexistent. Reykjavik, the island's capital, had a population of 38,000, two theaters, and one hotel. It was the liberty town for a force of 30,000 British soldiers and U.S. Marines. Muster rolls reveal that some Marines managed to get in trouble in the town of Harfnarfjordur, but not many.

During the Iceland occupation, the artillery battalion's firing batteries were attached to the infantry battalions; Battery D to the 1st Battalion; Battery E, 2d Battalion; and Battery F, 3d Battalion. In September, Army Major General Charles H. Bonesteel arrived to assume command of the Iceland Base Command and the Marine Brigade was transferred from the control of the Secretary of the Navy to that of the Secretary of War. This irritating move was accomplished over the strong objection of the Commandant, but proved to be the only such transfer during the war years.

WORLD WAR II

At 0755, 7 December 1941, Japanese naval aircraft attacked the United States Pacific Fleet at Pearl Harbor. The Japanese attack threw the west coast into a virtual panic. A blackout was imposed due to fear of air attack. Two days later, when 34 Japanese ships were reported closing on the Long Beach-San Diego area, the 10th Marines was among the units detailed to repel the invasion. The regiment's operations officer at the time, Brigadier General John S. Letcher, then a captain, recalls:

Ammunition was woefully short. We had one hundred and fifty rounds per gun which would be enough for a half day's battle. There was no more on the west coast . . . It was a never-to-be-forgotten morning with all of us feeling all we could do was to put up the best fight that we could for a half a day and then when the ammunition was gone, those who were left could start throwing rocks. 79

Fortunately, the Japanese did not choose to venture east of the Hawaiian Islands.



USMC Photo 528692

BGen John Marston, the Marine brigade commander, walks with Col Leo D. Hermle, Commanding Officer, 6th Marines (upper left of picture), while Army MajGen Charles H. Bonesteel (bottom left), talks with LtCol John B. Wilson, Commanding Officer, 2d Battalion, 10th Marines, during a visit to the 2d Battalion base area. MajGen Bonesteel assumed command of U.S. forces in Iceland from General Marston.

While the west coast of the United States was spared the attention of the Rising Sun, other Pacific areas felt its full virulence: Bangkok occupied 8 December; Guam surrendered and the British battleship Prince of Wales and battlecruiser Repulse sunk on 10 December; Burma invaded on 16 December; the Philippines invaded on 22 December; Wake Island overwhelmed on 23 December; Hong Kong taken on Christmas Day; and impregnable Singapore captured on 15 February 1942. The Japanese offensive had lightly touched Marine garrisons on Palmyra, Johnston, and Midway Islands, but no enemy landings were attempted. Reinforcements for the Midway and American Samoa garrisons were quickly organized to prevent further island losses. While defense battalions and an aviation unit did the honors for Midway, the 2d Marine Brigade was formed around the 8th Marines for the defense of American Samoa. Other principal units assigned to the brigade were the 2d Defense Battalion and the 1st Battalion, 10th Marines. The brigade was formed on 24 December and sailed from San Diego on 6 January 1942 on board the luxury liners Lurline, Matsonia, and Monterey. These ships provided the finest transport a 10th Marines unit had received since riding the President Grant to

China in 1927. The brigade, under the command of Henry L. Larson, a brand new brigadier general, arrived at Pago Pago harbor on the island of Tutuila on 19 January. Three months of hard work preparing the island's defenses were followed by a rigorous training and conditioning program which went far in preparing the brigade's Marines for the stiff jungle fighting which lay ahead on Guadalcanal.

During the early months of 1942, while the 2d Brigade improved Samoan defenses, the rush of events at home and abroad continued. With the attack on Pearl Harbor, the Navy began agitating for the return of Marines from Iceland. The first increment, the 3d Battalion, 6th Marines, left the island at the end of January while the last of the Marine brigade departed on board the transport USS Mc-Cawley (AP-10) on 8 March, thus ending eight months of duty in a most unlikely place.

The 5th Battalion, 10th Marines was formed on 10 February with now Major Letcher as its commanding officer and the 75mm pack howitzer as its weapon. In order to conduct concentrated artillery training, the 3d, 4th, and 5th Battalions moved to the vicinity of Niland, California, in March. The town of Niland (1940 population: 627) and its nearby artillery training area was in the northern end of the Imperial Valley. The artillery men established Camp Dunlap and settled in for six weeks of intensive training. The 5th Battalion commander wrote:

It was an ideal place for artillery training with ample space for all kinds of field exercises and service practices.

We stayed there for six weeks. The men lived in their shelter tents. The cooks cooked the rations on field ranges. There was no water except for drinking. There were no lights at night except a few kerosene lanterns used in the battery office tents and the kitchen tents. The wind blew with more or less violence all the time and whipped up the fine sand which got into everything.

The living conditions were rather uncomfortable but despite this, or maybe because of it, this was the best training period that I ever experienced. We never again accomplished as much as we did during those six weeks. There was no liberty for anyone except for weekends. Half of the command had liberty on Saturdays and the other half on Sundays and liberty expired at midnight. With no lights there was nothing to do when darkness came but to go to sleep. There was no post exchange to sell candy, soft drinks, or other trash to kill the men's appetites for their regular meals. There was no beer parlor. Sleeping from dark until daylight and eating only their regular meals the men were always well rested, in top physical condition, and eager to work. In addition to the artillery training they learned to take care of themselves under the same conditions under which they would be forced to live during a campaign.80

Major Letcher's Battery N commander, himself a future commander of the 10th Marines, now-retired Colonel George B. Thomas recalled:

battalion commander. He was a fair and firm disciplinarian as well as a stickler for training. All hands suffered and benefitted in a similar manner from this tremendous experience. It was difficult to distinguish between officer and enlisted quarters since both utilized shelter "pup" tents located indiscriminately on the desert sand and scattered between the cactus plants. One afternoon a lieutenant reported for duty with "N" Battery and pitched his "pup" tent near the battery galley. In the early darkness the next morning the battery mess cook on duty shook the new lieutenant and asked him if he was a messman. The lieutenant growled, "Hell no." The mess cook grabbed him by the foot, said "Yes you are," and dragged him out onto the sand.

The 75mm pack howitzer with which the unit was equipped had wooden wheels with steel tires similar to the old steel-tired wagon. Wheels with rubber tires were supplied later. Towing by hand, with the gun section crew as the primer mover, was the most common means of locomotion for these weapons during this period of desert training. Toggle ropes were provided as an item of gun section equipment. Top physical condition for the gun crew resulted, in no small part, from the many hours of towing these weapons through the sand. A high degree of motivation was achieved through numerous training schemes, designed by the battalion commander, to test artillery skills and, at the same time, to provide friendly competition between the batteries.⁸¹

The 2d Battalion returned to Camp Elliott from Iceland on 31 March and began conducting the training it had gone without for eight months.

Meanwhile, in the Pacific, the Japanese juggernaut had slowed after suffering two setbacks at sea. On 8 May, a Japanese task force headed for the invasion of Port Moresby, New Guinea, was engaged by an American-Australian fleet in the Battle of the Coral Sea. What resulted was a tactical vctory for the Japanese (less ship damage and fewer casualties) but a strategic victory for the Allies; the invasion fleet was turned back from its intended target.

The next month the central Pacific shook to the fury of the Battle of Midway, the decisive naval engagement of the Pacific war. This battle, which resulted in the destruction of four Japanese aircraft carriers and a large percentage of Japan's highly trained naval pilots, proved to be a blow from which the Imperial Japanese Navy never recovered. As the Japanese authors of Midway: The Battle That Doomed Japan state, "The catastrophe of Midway definitely marked the turning of the tide in the Pacific War." Marines would be grateful for the next three

years as they assaulted island after island that the wings of the Japanese fleet had been clipped at Midway.

Guadalcanal - The First One

Nineteen days after the last engagement at Midway, 25 June, the Pacific Fleet was ordered to prepare plans for the invasion of the Japanese-held British Solomon Islands Protectorate, Operation Watchtower. The pace set was a quick one. Major General Vandegrift, in Wellington, New Zealand, as commanding general of the 1st Marine Division, was given his warning order the next day. The problems associated with planning the Solomons landing on Guadalcanal and Tulagi Islands were many. Initially the Navy wanted a D-Day of 1 August; General Vandegrift pressed for and won a postponement until the 7th. There were no complete, ac-

The small island of Tanambogo, the scene of heavy fighting during the Guadalcanal campaign, as view-


curate maps of either Guadalcanal or Tulagi in existence. Lieutenant Colonel Frank B. Goettge, former Quantico Marines football great and the division's intelligence officer, flew to Australia and interviewed traders, planters, miners, and shipmasters who had knowledge of the islands. Army bombers were borrowed from General Douglas MacArthur and pressed into service on photographic sorties. The 1st Division was understrength with the 7th Marines helping the 2d Brigade to defend American Samoa. On 27 June, Admiral Ernest J. King, Chief of Naval Operations, suggested transferring the 2d Marines to General Vandegrift. An amazing four days later the 2d Marines (reinforced) sailed from San Diego.

Among the units reinforcing the 2d Marines was the 3d Battalion, 10th Marines at a strength of 32 officers and 553 enlisted men, now commanded by Major Manly L. Curry, and armed with the 75mm pack howitzer. Carrying the 2d Marines (reinforced) to war were the "Unholy Three," troop transports

ed from Gavutu. The causeway connecting the two islands can be seen to the right.

USMC Photo 51797





USS President Jackson (AP 37), USS President Adams (AP 28) and USS President Hayes (AP 39), ex-civilian passenger liners which retained little if any of their former peacetime splendor.

The task force arrived at Tongatabu, Tonga Islands on the 18th and six days later steamed toward the island of Koro in the Fijis for a rendezvous with the entire invasion fleet. The Watchtower force converged on Koro from New Zealand, Noumea in New Caledonia, Pearl Harbor, and San Diego. Nearly 19,000 Marines were embarked in 23 ships. After a conference, which was badly needed, and rehearsals, which General Vandegrift declared "a complete bust," the invasion force sortied for Guadalcanal on 31 July. 83

The battle for Guadalcanal opened at 0613, 7 August 1942 with an 8-inch salvo from the heavy cruiser USS Quincy (CA 39). The first American land offensive of World War II was underway. The Marines were split into two landing groups. Group Yoke was under the command of Brigadier General William H. Rupertus, the assistant division commander (ADC), and was scheduled to land on the north side of Sealark Channel. The 1st Marine Raider Battalion and the 2d Battalion, 5th Marines were to land on Tulagi while the 1st Parachute Battalion was assigned the causeway-linked islands of Gavutu and Tanambogo. Group X-Ray, under the command of General Vandegrift, was scheduled to land at Lunga Point on Guadalcanal. This group was composed of the 1st Marines and the 5th Marines, less its 2d Battalion.

Colonel John M. Arthur's 2d Marines, with 3d Battalion, 10th Marines attached, originally had been scheduled to be the landing force reserve. General Vandegrift was surprised to learn at the Koro conference that, instead, the Navy desired to assault the island of Ndeni in the Santa Cruz group. As it turned out, the Ndeni operation was overtaken by events on Guadalcanal.

The Tulagi-Gavutu-Tanambogo landings were protected by two security landings on Florida Island conducted by the 1st Battalion, 2d Marines. A landing at Haleta at 0740 protected the Tulagi flank while a simultaneous landing on the Halavo Peninsula protected the Gavutu-Tanambogo flank. The Tulagi landing went off at 0800 across Blue Beach. Initial opposition was light. Night, however, brought four counter-attacks and it was not until the next day that all resistance was eliminated.

At 0910 the 5th Marines (-) hit the beach on Guadalcanal, the 1st Battalion on the right of the 2d

Battalion. Following in trace, the 1st Marines started landing at 0930 in a column of battalions. When night fell the Marines on Guadalcanal were strung out along what their maps called the Tenaru River, but which was actually the Ilu.

Insufficient landing craft on the north side of Sealark Channel had prevented simultaneous landings on both Tulagi and Gavutu. The 1st Parachute Battalion's landing was scheduled for four hours after the Raider landing on Tulagi. By that time the Gavutu defenders had figured out what was next. They were ready. The parachutists found the going stiff and requested reinforcements. General Rupertus ordered the left flank security force on Florida Island, Company B, 1st Battalion, 2d Marines, to cross over to Gavutu. When it arrived it was ordered to seize Tanambogo. The reinforcements tried, but were driven off by intense Japanese fire. Additional reinforcements were committed. The 3d Battalion, 2d Marines and Battery I, 3d Battalion, 10th Marines landed on Gavutu at 1000, 8 August. That day, as the 1st Platoon of Company K charged across the causeway to Tanambogo, the 4th Section, Battery I fired the opening artillery round of the campaign. Its target was Japanese snipers on the nearby islet of Gaomi. Corporal Cecil E. Chastain, section chief, carried the polished brass casing, engraved with the date and place of firing, throughout the war.84

The Japanese Navy was not lying idle during the Marine landings at Guadalcanal. Early on 8 August, Rear Admiral Gunichi Mikawa came boiling down from the north with seven cruisers and a destroyer. Events quickly moved to a climax. Vice Admiral Frank J. Fletcher, commander of the carrier force, USS Saratoga (CV 3), USS Wasp (CV 7), USS Enterprise (CV 6), announced he was retiring from the area because of fuel shortage and aircraft losses. Rear Admiral Richmond Kelly Turner, commander of the amphibious task force, argued with him, lost, and then called General Vandegrift to his flagship. Once on board, the Marine commander was informed that the departure of the carrier air support and the imminent arrival of the Japanese task force required the departure of the remaining U.S. warships and amphibians by 0600 the next day. This turn of events was bad enough. What happened nine hours later was far worse.

Admiral Mikawa, moving down The Slot, undetected, at 24 knots, got in among the U.S. and Australian men-of-war stationed around Savo Island. Mikawa ordered "independent firing" at 0136 and "all ships withdraw" at 0220. The actions



A 75mm pack howitzer crew is ready for action in a camouflaged emplacement on Tulagi during the

USMC Photo 52067 Guadalcanal campaign. By this time, the pack howitzer had acquired a modern carriage.

during the intervening 44 minutes proved to be the death of four Allied ships and 1,023 men. The Japanese suffered a total of 111 casualties. The U.S. heavy cruisers *Vincennes, Quincy*, and USS *Astoria* (CA 34) as well as the Australian heavy cruiser HMAS *Canberra* became the first of many ships to settle in Ironbottom Sound. The heavy cruiser USS *Chicago* (CA 29) lost part of her bow, but avoided sinking. Up to its time, the Battle of Savo Island was the worst defeat at sea ever inflicted upon the United States Navy.⁸⁵

In the midst of this death and disaster, a kind Providence smiled upon the Americans. Admiral Mikawa, unaware of Fletcher's scurry to the southwest, failed to go after the defenseless

transports sitting only 17 miles to the east. Fearing an air attack in the rapidly approaching dawn, he turned his ships around and, cracking on 30 knots, headed back up The Slot for Rabaul. Admiral Turner, to his everlasting credit, had continued unloading his transports during the battle of Savo Island.

Starting at 0900 on 9 August, the 1st and 2d Battalions, 2d Marines and Battery H, 3d Battalion, 10th Marines went ashore at Tulagi. Units of the 2d Battalion were assigned the mission of seizing and clearing several islands around Tulagi. Battery H supported one of these landings, firing a 10-minute preparatory bombardment of Makambo for Company E.

On the afternoon of the 9th, Admiral Turner and the remaining ships of his task force departed for Espiritu Santo in the New Hebrides. When the Navy left Guadalcanal, not all the Marines in the landing force had been landed. Colonel Arthur, Major Curry, and 1,400 men from the 2d Marines, Battery G, and H&S Battery, 3d Battalion, 10th Marines were still embarked. While Colonel Arthur and Major Curry managed to get back with a few men on board the cargo ship USS Alhena (AK 26) on the 22d, it was not until 19 October that the remaining Marines returned to Guadalcanal in the Fuller. 86

On Guadalcanal, after the departure of the Navy, the campaign had assumed all the characteristics of a cliffhanger. The Japanese reinforced their garrison almost at will. Rations were pitifully short; the early destruction of captured Japanese food stuffs and rice quickly ceased. Worst of all, the sea and the night belonged to the "Tokyo Express," Japanese warships that prowled The Slot with impunity. For the only time during the Pacific counteroffensive, the Marines were subjected to enemy naval bombardment. The night of 19 August provided the first of several sobering experiences. It was later written:

War has many and varied terrors, but few equal the paralyzing horror of a naval shelling. The Japs had major calibre guns trained on Tulagi and Gavutu that night, and there was nothing on the beach heavy enough to answer. The Marines could only scrunch lower and lower in the shallow trenches and hope and, perhaps, pray.⁸⁷

In the United States Colonel Bourke relinquished his command of the regiment to Colonel John B. Wilson on 5 August. The new commander remained with the 10th Marines for only 25 days before being relieved in turn by Lieutenant Colonel Ralph E. Forsyth. Colonel Wilson traded one artillery regiment for another, becoming the first commander of the newly reactivated 12th Marines.

The fight for Guadalcanal lasted longer than any other island campaign the Marines conducted during the Pacific war. Early in the campaign both sides realized reinforcements were vital and took steps to provide them. The 10th Marines, in late summer of 1942, was spread from one side of the Pacific to the other: Headquarters, 2d and 4th Battalions in California (the 5th Battalion had been redesignated 1st Battalion, 12th Marines (9th Marines Reinf) Amphibious Corps, Pacific on 14 August); the 1st Battalion was garrisoning American Samoa with the 8th Marines; and the 3d Battalion was split between the Guadalcanal area and Espiritu Santo.

On 21 October, two days after the remainder of the 3d Battalion, 10th Marines had been returned from Espiritu Santo, the U.S. Navy caught the "Tokyo Express" off Guadalcanal. In a confused night engagement, Rear Admiral Norman Scott's force managed to pull off a classic naval gunnery maneuver and cross the "T" on the Japanese.* In addition to the destruction of two Japanese warships, the night's action permitted the unopposed approach and unloading of the troop transports Mc-Cawley and USS Zeilin (AP 9). The transports carried welcome replacements from the 1st Marine Aircraft Wing and the 164th Infantry of the Americal Division, U.S. Army. The "Tokyo Express" was back three days later and welcomed the Army to Guadalcanal with an 80-minute bombardment.

One group of Marines in 1942 certainly proved what an adaptable creature man is. The 2d Battalion, 10th Marines and the 6th Marines, after braving the frigid Icelandic winter of 1941-42, sailed from San Diego in the SS *Matsonia* on 19 October bound for New Zealand and a south seas version of winter.

The 2d Marine Division was converging on the battle. Marines, who had spent nine months on Samoa, the 1st Battalion, 10th Marines and the 8th Marines, sailed for Guadalcanal on 25 October. Instead of the luxury liners which had taken them to Samoa, the Marines rode the troop transports President Hayes, Barnett, USS Hunter Liggett (AP 27) and the American merchantman SS Alcoa Pennant.

The last elements of the regiment to sail west were the regimental headquarters and the 4th Battalion which was now equipped with the new 105mm howitzer. These units departed San Diego in the SS President Monroe on 3 November. They reached their destination, Wellington, New Zealand, on the 22d and moved into Camp Judgeford, 15 miles to the northeast, the next day. Colonel Bourke reassumed command of the regiment from Lieutenant Colonel Forsyth the day the regiment arrived in camp. Both regimental headquarters and the 4th Battalion remained in New Zealand.

In late October, it became evident to General Vandegrift that the Japanese were beginning an all-

^{*}A maneuver in which one side sails in column ahead of and at right angles to the enemy who is approaching in column. This allows the first side to bring a maximum number of guns to bear on the enemy lead ship, while the majority of the enemy guns are masked by his own ships. This was the stuff of which dreams were made back in the days of gunfire navies.

out move to push the U.S. forces into the sea. Additional artillery was needed to supplement Colonel Pedro del Valle's magnificent 11th Marines. Accordingly, on 25 October, Battery I, 3d Battalion, 10th Marines, which had spent more than two months sitting across Sealark Channel from the big action, made the move to Guadalcanal. Two small ships were used to transport the battery, the harbor patrol boat YP 284 and the fleet tug USS Seminole (AT 65). While these two craft were landing Battery I Marines, howitzers, and gasoline about three and a half miles east of Lunga Point, three Japanese destroyers appeared from the direction of Savo Island. The Akatsuki, Ikazuchi, and Shiratsuyu first engaged two destroyer minesweepers, USS Trever (DMS 16) and USS Zane (DMS 14), which had just offloaded supplies at Tulagi. A providential attack by several U.S. aircraft caused the Japanese to turn back to the west toward the Marine airstrip, Henderson Field. Unfortunately. Seminole and YP-284 lay on this new course. Both U.S. ships had broken off unloading and had gotten underway when the Japanese first were sighted. They had not gone far when the Japanese turned from pursuing the destroyer minesweepers. The enemy's 35-knot warships rapidly closed on the helpless Americans, firing as they came. At 1050, YP 284 was hit and set on fire. A few minutes later she slid under the surface. taking with her three men. Two were Marines: Private First Class LaVerne D. Darling and Private George A. McCartney, both Battery I artillerymen. They were the first members of the regiment to die from enemy action since the creation of the Artillery Battalion at Vera Cruz in 1914. No bodies were recovered. Seminole was hit soon after and sank moments after being abandoned at 1115.88 Fortunately, battery weapons and equipment had been offloaded before the two ships began their flight from the Japanese.

That evening, heavy fighting swirled south of Henderson Field around the front held by the legendary Lieutenant Colonel Lewis B. "Chesty" Puller's 1st Battalion, 7th Marines and the Army's 3d Battalion, 164th Infantry. The 3d Battalion, 2d Marines, held in reserve at Henderson Field, dispatched Company I to the juncture of these two battalions. There, the line was under a concentrated attack by Japanese riflemen and two machine gun companies. Had the enemy broken through, a jungle trail would have provided easy, direct access to the airfield. A desperate hail of artillery, mortar, and small arms fire prevented such a breakthrough

and the Japanese took a fearful beating. Among the Marine casualties that night was Sergeant Carl J. "Pop" Held, a Battery I forward observer. During the fighting he was shot in the right thigh, carried a short distance to the rear and given first aid and morphine. As the fighting moved forward, he was left behind. In the morning he was gone. His body was never found.89

The 1st Battalion, 10th Marines arrived at Guadalcanal with the 8th Marines on 4 November. The 1st Battalion's artillery fire was put in direct support of the 2d Raider Battalion (Carlson's Raiders) and the 7th Marines until the 9th of the month. Three infantry regiments (2d Marines, 8th Marines, 164th Infantry) attacked to the west of the Matanikau River on 10 November, supported by the two battalions of the 10th Marines. The next day the Marines were shocked to receive orders from General Vandegrift to pull back across the Matanikau. A massive "Tokyo Express" was on its way and the Naval Battle of Guadalcanal was about to begin.

It turned out to be a classic. While U.S. aircraft bombed and sunk Japanese transports west of Guadalcanal, the destroyers, cruisers, and battleships traded red-hot salvos in The Slot and the waters of Ironbottom Sound. Events culminated on the night of 14-15 November when Rear Admiral Willis A. (Ching) Lee, flying his flag in the new 16-inch gun battleship USS Washington (BB 56), steamed straight up The Slot and met the "Tokyo Express" head on. The action was one of only four in World War II which pitted battleship against battleship. At 0320, 15 November, the loser, the 14-inch gunned Kirishima, settled to the bottom northwest of Savo Island.

The Matanikau was recrossed on 18 November and the U.S. ground attack was underway once again, only to be held up on the 23d. The men, Marine and Army alike, were tired and shot through with dysentery and malaria. For a month the line was held just west of the Matanikau while patrols dueled in the jungle.

General Vandegrift was relieved of command ashore on 9 December by Major General Alexander M. Patch, USA, commander of the Americal Division which then had all its units on the island. The same day, the 1st Marine Division began leaving for a well deserved rest in Australia. The 2d Marines, 8th Marines, and 1st and 3d Battalions, 10th Marines, remained. General Patch maintained a slow, steady pressure on the Japanese.

The remainder of the 3d Battalion, 10th Marines

was shuttled over from Tulagi in the fleet tug USS Bobolink (AT 131) on 21 December. Unlike the unfortunate Seminole and YP 284 experience two months prior, this crossing was uneventful. The next day the reunited battalion fired in support of the 132d Infantry's assault of Mt. Austen.

The day after Christmas, the 6th Marines and the 2d Battalion, 10th Marines mounted out from New Zealand on board the "Unholy Three." The ships put in at Noumea, New Caledonia, on the 30th and arrived in Ironbottom Sound on 4 January. The 2d Marine Division less Headquarters, 10th Marines and its 4th Battalion was together, intact, and in action for the first time.* The Army's 25th Division had also arrived at Guadalcanal in early January, boosting the count of U.S. forces to nearly 50,000. On the 10th of January General Patch launched the final drive to secure Guadalcanal. The 25th Division and the 1st Battalion, 2d Marines were sent inland to strike down across the valleys to Cape Esperance while the 2d Marine Division moved west along the coast.

During the push to the west end of the island, fire support history was made when naval gunfire spotters were attached to the 1st Battalion, 10th Marines and used to adjust destroyer fire for the 8th Marines. The coastal terrain of Guadalcanal, with deep valleys running perpendicular to the sea, was made for naval gunfire. One of these naval officers, Lieutenant (Junior Grade) Alfred E. Moon, later traveled across the Pacific with the Marines, hitting the beaches of Tarawa, Kwajalein, Saipan, Tinian, and Iwo Jima.⁹⁰

The Japanese steadily retreated to the west. There were occasional sharp engagements, but it was clear the game was up for the Japanese. The 2d Marines; the 1st Battalion, 8th Marines; and the 3d Battalion, 10th Marines left Guadalcanal on 31 January, arriving at Wellington six days later. The 1st Battalion, 10th Marines and the remainder of the 8th Marines departed in the transports *Hunter Liggett* and USS American Legion (AP 35) on 9 February, arriving at

Wellington on the 17th. They day they left, the day the island was declared secure, the 2d Battalion, 10th Marines was the only Marine unit left in action on Guadalcanal.*

One of the battalion's battery commanders, then-Captain Kenneth C. Houston, recalled one of the campaign's last operations:

About two weeks before Guadalcanal was declared secure, Battery F, 2d Battalion, 10th Marines was assigned to the Army 25th Division. Battery F was attached to an Army battalion and landed on the west coast of Guadalcanal about 30 miles south of Cape Esperance. The purpose of this operation was to prevent supplies and reinforcements from being landed in a bay about 10-15 miles south of the cape. The landing was made from destroyer transports and an LCT for Battery F pack howitzers and aummunition. We made the landing and advanced north, meeting some resistance from scattered detachments. The landing force reached its objective, the bay, in about five days and set in a perimeter defense there until all resistance ceased.91

The 2d Battalion, 10th Marines sailed from Guadalcanal with the 6th Marines in the transports

*Col William P. Oliver, Jr., a future commander of the regiment, but at that time a member of the 3d Battalion recalled, "10th Marines people always sought to exercise the Marine mystique on our counterparts in the U.S. Army artillery. I had manned an OP for the 3d Battalion, shooting toward Mt. Austen, and knew the area very well. Subsequently the U.S. Army took over our positions. My scout sergeant, Max Jasso, of Indian descent from New Mexico, and I became bored one day just before our departure from Guadalcanal, and we decided to visit our old OP. The 3d Battalion was, of course, still in firing positions in general support of Army operations.

"Jasso and I walked up the OP hill just as a Japanese mortar round hit there. A captain's bar on my collar was hit (10th Marines officers wore their insignia both in combat and in camp) and Jasso was struck in the mid-section. He thought he was at the point of death, but I could find no wound. He had been wearing a Japanese Army belt with a heavy metal buckle. It was cracked, but Jasso wasn't. Anyway both he and I were madder than hell at such a welcome to our old territory. The Army people were similarly upset and pointed out to me where the irritating mortar was being fired. It happened to be at a check point on which some time before I had registered the 3d Battalion guns.

"I told the Army we Marines would handle this unpleasantness. There had not been time to tell the Army observers we had been on their OP before or that we were artillerymen. I went down the hill and, called in a fire-for-effect, battalion three rounds, on the offending checkpoint. By the time I got up the hill again, 36 3d Battalion rounds were swooshing overhead and right onto the mortar position.

"The Army lieutenant said, 'How in hell did you do that?'
"Do you think I told him?" Col William P. Oliver, Jr., Comments on draft MS, dtd 1Jul80.

^{*}BGen Marvin H. Floom, who was the regimental operations officer at the time, recalled that Col Burke and a small regimental headquarters detachment, including Floom, another staff officer, and three enlisted men, flew to Guadalcanal after the 2d Division departed New Zealand. According to Floom, this 10th Marines headquarters detachment "provided a Div Arty capability to coordinate 2d Mar Div Arty and the Army's 25th Division." BGen Marvin H. Floom, Comments on draft MS, dtd 31Dec80.

President Hayes, President Jackson, and USS Crescent City (AP 40) on the 19th of February. These Marines reoccupied their pre-Guadalcanal cantonment at Camp McKays Crossing on 28 February and the 2d Division was intact once again.

There was never another battle quite like Guadalcanal. While later ones were costlier to both sides, the men who fought at Guadalcanal need make no apologies. Each side's Navy lost 24 ships, many coming to rest in the aptly nicknamed Ironbottom Sound. Much has been written about the battle in both official histories and fiction. Perhaps one of the most fitting tributes was uttered when:

On October 27, 1947, a Japanese soldier dressed in a ragged uniform, his hair grown to his waist, emerged from a Guadalcanal cave. This strange creature entered a Solomon Island constabulary post and surrendered. He inquired about the war, for he did not know it was over. Then, in a voice cracked from disuse, he asked, "Where are the American Marines?"

When told they had departed five years before, he sighed and said, "It was no disgrace to be beaten by such men."92

New Zealand Recuperation

The sight that greeted the 2d Marine Division as it pulled into Wellington harbor reminded many of San Francisco. The cool, green hills and neatly painted homes were a marked contrast to the unpleasantness of the steaming, decaying Guadalcanal jungles. Since the New Zealanders had no established division-size camps available, the Marines were spread out over the countryside. After all units had arrived on the island, the 2d, 6th, and 8th Marines were clustered around the small town of Paekakariki, 35 miles from Wellington. The 10th Marines, less the 2d Battalion, was established at Pahautanui, 18 miles from the capital, while the division headquarters was established in the Windsor Hotel in downtown Wellington. Most Marines also became familiar with either the division's hospital at Anderson Park in Wellington or the Navy hospital at Silver Stream. Practically everyone who had been on Guadalcanal came down with malaria sooner or later.

Liberty, rest, and rehabilitation occupied the division for the first several months on New Zealand. Intensive training for the next operation lay in the future and work details were light. New Zealanders welcomed the Marines with a genuine enthusiasm

and friendliness that was to last throughout their stay.


One of the first things the Marines did when they got into Wellington for liberty was drink the town dry—of milk. It was several days before this strange compulsion was satiated. New Zealand was not overly endowed with alcoholic beverages, but the Marines in typical fashion made do. Locally concocted "jump whiskey," a foul, green, Mexican "scotch" called Juarez, and a one part port/two parts stout mixture called "shellshock" were consumed in memorable quantities. After existing on short Guadalcanal rations for up to six months, the Marines eagerly adopted the hearty New Zealand approach to eating. The division got well in New Zealand.93

Tarawa – Code-Named Helen

While this rehabilitation was going on, top level meetings were being held in Washington to determine Pacific strategy. It was decided that a thrust at Japan through the Central Pacific would be mounted by the forces under Admiral Nimitz and that General MacArthur would continue his South and Southwest Pacific drive. Central Pacific goals for 1943/44 were the seizure of bases in the Marshalls and Carolines.

After World War I, as a spoil of war, Japan was given a mandate over the former German-owned Marshalls and Carolines. The terms of the mandate were such that fortification of the islands was forbidden. A United States Marine, Lieutenant Colonel Earl H. Ellis, was convinced that the Japanese were fortifying the islands and that the Japanese were America's inevitable foe. In 1923 he requested and received a one-year leave of absence. He showed up in the Japanese-mandated Palau Islands as a "tourist," but died shortly thereafter without positively confirming his suspicions. When Japan withdrew from the League of Nations in 1935, she clamped a total security screen around her mandated islands and began fortification in earnest.

Because of the decades-long lack of intelligence regarding the Marshalls and Carolines, planners urged the capture of islands in the adjacent Gilberts. These would act as stepping stones and bases for badly needed reconnaissance of the mandated islands. On 20 July 1942, the Joint Chiefs of Staff directed Admiral Nimitz to begin planning such a campaign. The main target of Operation Galvanic



was Tarawa, a formerly British-owned coral atoll consisting of many small islands strung out along a 22-mile reef. The island of Betio in Tarawa atoll was the center of Japanese defenses in the Gilberts and had an airstrip which could be used by land-based reconnaissance aircraft.

The 2d Marine Division was to be the major ground unit employed in the landing. D-Day was set for 20 November and the division began an intensive training program.

On the 12th of June, Colonel Bourke was promoted, uniquely becoming the "commanding general" rather than the commanding officer of the 10th Marines. Major General Julian C. Smith, the division's commander, wanted an experienced hand in command of his artillery regiment during the upcoming campaign. Consequently, General Bourke did not relinquish command of his regiment until after Tarawa had been secured.

The 10th Marines became a five-battalion organization on 14 June when the 5th Battalion, 10th Marines was formed at Pahautanui under Major William L. Crouch. The new battalion was armed with the 105mm howitzer.

During the concentrated training which preceded the Tarawa landing, the 10th Marines practiced massing the fires of the entire regiment at the Waioru range. Fresh from the Army's Field Artillery School at Fort Sill, Lieutenant Colonel Marvin H. Floom, the regimental operations officer, introduced into the practice shoot several of the new gunnery techniques that he had just learned. The regiment by then consisted of three 75mm-pack-howitzer (1st, 2d, 3d) and two 105mm-howitzer (4th, 5th) battalions.

During October, the division practiced its landing techniques at Hawkes Bay on New Zealand's east coast and near the infantry's camp at Paekakariki. The amphibian tractors (LVT) practiced climbing over reefs with troops on board. These "alligators" had been used before on Guadalcanal for supply and rescue missions, but at Tarawa they would make the assault. Betio was known to be surrounded by reefs; a fact which soon would be hammered home in deadly earnest.*

The artillery began loading on board ship in Wellington Harbor on the 17th of October with the 1st and 2d Battalions the first to embark. By the 30th the entire regiment was on board its assigned transports. The 1st, 2d, and 3d Battalions travelled with, and were attached to, the 2d, 6th, and 8th Marines respectively, The 4th and 5th Battalions, in general support of the division, traveled with Division Troops on board the troop transports USS Doyen (AP 1), USS LaSalle (AP 102), and USS Ormsby (APA 49). Near dawn of the 1st of November, the ships carrying the 2d Marine Division slipped out of Wellington harbor. New Zealand would be fondly remembered. More than 500 Marines were leaving brides behind.**

The convoy dropped anchors in Mele Bay, Efate Island, the New Hebrides on 7 November. There, General Bourke and a small staff transferred from the *Doyen* to the battleship USS *Maryland* (BB 46). The "Mary" was serving as the flagship of the task force commander, Rear Admiral Harry W. Hill, and as the command post of the 2d Marine Division. Two rehearsal landings were made at Mele Bay, the second one complete with live naval bombardment.

A wild rumor swept the task force when it left Efate on 13 November; the Marines were going to liberate Wake Island. General Julian Smith disabused them of such thoughts when he ordered intensive briefings for all embarked Marines.

The Japanese had nearly 5,000 troops and Korean laborers on Tarawa. They manned 20 coastal defense

by twice taking a week and having reveille at 1730 and working through the night with dinner at 0530. All training was done in the dark, PSOP's, vehicle and equipment repair in blackout equipment tents, hikes, etc; all done during the night. It turned out to be excellent training.

"The training at the Waioru desert was the greatest. The area was tremendous and restrictions on firing almost non-existent. It was interesting to watch those fine young men develop, awkwardness to coordination and skill, flab to muscle, and strength, and increased confidence in doing their jobs. The officers knew their men; they were with them 24 hours a day. Distractions were few, administrative requirements were minimal, and training was the top priority. Too bad we can't have more of this in peace time. The battalion was finally trained in artillery, could march any distance with the best of them, and was in great physical condition. I thought they were ready mentally and physically." Col Kenneth A. Jorgensen, Comments on draft MS, dtd 28Jul80.

**BGen Floom remembered that "In an attempt to deceive and confuse 2d Mar Div watchers a cover plan for a Div LEX [Landing Exercise] on the west coast of the North Island was leaked to cool anxieties as to final . . . departure and reduce speculation as to next real landing target." BGen Marvin H. Floom, Comments on draft MS, dtd 31Dec80.

^{*}Col Kenneth A. "Duke" Jorgensen, the 4th Battalion commander, recalled "New Zealand was an outstanding place to train. There was varied terrain and some isolated roads for night motor marches and hiking. We had light calisthenics each morning and heavy exercises at the end of the training each day. All hands, everyone, participated. The division required so many hours of night training each month. We more than met this requirement

guns, 25 assorted howitzers and field pieces, and 31 heavy and uncounted light machine guns. To these were added seven light tanks, concrete tetrahedrons on a razor-sharp reef, double-apron barbed wire in the water between beach and reef, and log fences immediately inland from the beach. The Japanese defenders sat in low, massive, reinforced concrete bunkers covered with layers of sand and coconut logs. Rear Admiral Keiji Shibasaki, Tarawa's commander, was reputed to have boasted that his island could not be taken "with a million men in a hundred years." 94

Arrayed against this formidable bastion was the 2d Marine Division, naval aviation forces under Rear Admiral John H. Hoover, three battleships, two heavy and three light cruisers, and nine destroyers. All this combat power was to be hurled against a speck of land less than two miles long and one-half mile wide at its widest. Rear Admiral Howard F. Kingman, naval gunfire support commander at Tarawa, could be forgiven his galloping optimism for stating, "We do not intend to neutralize it, we do not intend to destroy it. Gentlemen, we will obliterate it."95

Two schools of thought; Admiral Shibasaki's on one hand and Admiral Kingman's on the other. As it turned out, both were wrong.

Because Betio was so small and could not physically support complex, sweeping maneuver, the plan for taking it was simple. Combat Team 2 under Colonel David M. Shoup, later 22d Commandant of the Marine Corps, would make the assault. The combat team consisted of the 2d and 3d Battalions, 2d Marines; the 2d Battalion, 8th Marines; and the 1st Battalion, 10th Marines, with the 1st Battalion, 2d Marines as regimental reserve. The 8th Marines battalion was to land on Red Beach 3 to the east of a long pier that extended to the reef. The two assault battalions of the 2d Marines were assigned Red Beach 1 and 2 to the right. The two remaining battalions of the 8th Marines were division reserve. The 6th Marines was V Amphibious Corps reserve, to be released only by the corps commander, Major General H. M. Smith.

The division commander initially had desired to land his artillery on an adjacent islet in the Tarawa atoll. Once there it would be able to fire precision destruction missions in support of the main landing on Betio. This plan was disapproved for two reasons. A preliminary landing would require the amphibious task force to remain in the objective area longer than was deemed prudent in light of Japanese

air and submarine capability. Additionally, with the 6th Marines held in corps reserve, the division did not have the force required for two separate landings.⁹⁶

In order to hit the Japanese at what was presumed to be their weakest flank, the assault would be made on the lagoon side of Betio. The first three waves were to be carried in LVTs to ensure their getting over the reef. There were not enough LVTs to carry all assault waves; Marines scheduled to land after the third wave would have to come in by boat. The landing craft had a draft of four feet; most estimates predicted five feet over the reef at H-hour, but at least one longtime Tarawa resident warned of as little as three feet.

At 0507, 20 November, the Japanese opened fire on the troop transports with an 8-inch gun captured from the British at Singapore. This fire was answered by the *Maryland's* 16-inch rifles and was soon silenced. Through a series of misunderstandings, the coordination of air strikes and naval gunfire support was faulty. The naval guns checked fire for an air strike that did not materialize on time. This resulted in periods of time during which the target was free of all fire. To further compound difficulties, an unexpected current slowed the forward progress of the LVT waves, causing two postponements of H-hour.

As the LVTs waddled out of the water and across the reef, Japanese machine gun and antiboat fire began finding its mark. Naval gunfire and air strikes, while disrupting enemy communications, had done little damage to Japanese bunkers. Tarawa proved the ineffectiveness of flat trajectory fire against low, sand-covered bunkers. The usefulness of fuze-delay, high-angle fire was one of the battle's many lessons learned.

The 2d Battalion, 8th Marines on Red Beach 3 was the only unit to get ashore with some semblance of tactical integrity. Its lead LVT landed at 0917, followed quickly by the second and third waves.

In the center, the 2d Battalion, 2d Marines found Red Beach 2 a strip of high-explosive hell. Several LVTs were hit in the water. Those Marines who managed to land safely found themselves under fierce fire from the front and flanks.

An extremely strong Japanese emplacement near the junction of Red Beaches 1 and 2 caused a disorganized landing by the 3d Battalion, 2d Marines. Many LVTs were hit in the water by antiboat fire and the men who had to wade ashore were cut down by intense machine gun fire; a shocking prelude of things to come. The fourth wave off Red



Marines man a 75mm pack howitzer on Tarawa. The Marine standing over the howitzer is wearing a helmet with two holes in it: one on the side made by

USMC Photo 63569 a bullet as it entered and the other in front as it left. The weapon is being used for direct fire at very short range.

Beach 1 (led by one of the company commanders, Major, later Major General, Michael P. Ryan) was the first entire wave to be embarked in landing craft vice LVTs. Upon reaching the reef, the terrible discovery was made that there was not, after all, enough water to float the boats over. Wave four debarked and, rifles held high over head, began the long wade to the beach. Dead Marines began dotting the waters of the lagoon.

Colonel Shoup and his command group, which included Lieutenant Colonel Presley M. Rixey, commander of the 1st Battalion, 10th Marines, were boated in a landing craft outside the reef. After boarding an LVT returning from the beach, the Combat Team 2 command group headed for the beach. When the tractor was hit and the driver killed, the group continued in, wading along the pier. While still in the water, Colonel Shoup decided to commit the regimental reserve, the 1st Battalion, 2d Marines, and ordered it to land on Red Beach 2. The battalion managed to muster enough turnaround LVTs to land its rifle companies, but enemy fire was

so intense that many tractors were forced to shift to the right onto Red Beach 1.

Shortly before 1000, General Smith ordered one-half of his division reserve, 3d Battalion, 8th Marines, to the line of departure. At 1103 it was ordered to land. No LVTs were available when the battalion reached the reef and the first wave began a 700-yard walk to the beach. The carnage was unbelievable. Seventy percent of the first wave died in the lagoon. The second and third waves veered to the pier and made their way through the water, taking severe casualties. The division was now down to one battalion of reserves, and General Smith ordered it to the line of departure at 1343.

Shortly before this, the division commander had requested the corps reserve be released to his control. In less than an hour the request was approved. With this additional force at his disposal, General Smith asked where Colonel Shoup wanted the 1st Battalion, 8th Marines landed. Shoup never got the inquiry and the battalion spent the long night in open boats outside the reef.

The landing force on Betio on the afternoon of D-Day was short of just about everything: men, ammunition, and communication equipment. It was conspicuously short of heavy organic fire power. Medium tanks had been landed in the morning, but nearly all had been destroyed. Naval gunfire could not be used against many of the Japanese emplacements closest to friendly positions. To remedy this situation, at 1700 Lieutenant Colonel Rixey was ordered to land his artillery on Red Beach 2.

The artillerymen had been waiting at the line of departure since H plus 2 and "were growing impatient out there in the water, many suffering the discomfort of seasickness." Two gun sections, one each from Batteries A and B, were transferred to LVTs and came ashore. Three sections of Battery C, believed to be embarked in LVTs, were also ordered to land. Actually, these sections were in landing craft which could not get past the reef. Undaunted, the cannoneers broke down their pack howitzers and carried the pieces through waist-deep water to shore. That evening, while the rest of his battalion waited in boats outside the reef, Rixey and his five-section composite battery constituted the sum total of "heavy" supporting arms ashore.

During the night, a bulldozer which had somehow been landed during the day's confusion constructed an earthen berm to protect the artillery from small arms fire from across the airfield.

While Marines ashore fought and prayed through the night, to seaward plans were being made for the next day's operations. The men of 1st battalion, 8th Marines who remained boated throughout the night knew they would have an early and leading role. The battalion initially was to land on the eastern end of Betio, but at Colonel Shoup's insistence, the mission was changed. Instead, the battalion was told to land on Red Beach 2 and wheel to the right for a link-up with Major Ryan's 3d Battalion, 2d Marines. At 0615, the landing craft ground to a halt on the reef. In the face of even heavier fire than that experienced the day before, the Marines began their deadly walk to the beach.

The artillery, under the direct control of Lieutenant Colonel Rixey, did what it could to help. Two howitzers were used to deliver direct fire on two blockhouses at the water's edge astride the boundary of Red Beaches 1 and 2. High explosive rounds with delay fuzes at a range of 125 yards did the trick and the machine guns inside were silenced temporarily. The respite this action offered allowed the men in

the water a better chance as they neared shore. Once this mission was complete, the howitzers were hurriedly relaid by merely pointing them toward the eastern end of the island and laying barrels parallel. The frontage occupied by the battery was about 50 yards.

Perimeters were extended somewhat in the center of the island on D plus 1, but it would not be until D plus 2 that sufficient forces would be available to make any significant progress. Major Ryan's 3d Battalion, 2d Marines was joined by the 1st Battalion, 6th Marines and by nightfall had the western end of the island under control. The 2d Battalion, 6th Marines made a virtually unopposed landing on Bairiki, to the southeast of Betio.

By 1600 on D plus 1, the entire 1st Battalion, 10th Marines was ashore on Betio. Some artillerymen had even come ashore by rubber boat and life raft. One section was at the junction of Red Beaches 1 and 2, two sections were set up to fire at grounded hulks in the lagoon in case they were reoccupied by Japanese snipers during the night, and the rest of the howitzers faced inland and to the east to handle any necessary mission.

Colonel Shoup's 1600 situation report to General Smith noted the welcome presence of Rixey's unit. After describing the trace of friendly lines, the report concluded, "Pack howitzers in position and registered for shooting on the tail [east end of island]. Casualties: many. Percentage dead: unknown. Combat efficiency: we are winning, Shoup."98

Virtually the only humorous aspect of the battle for Tarawa is found in this account of D plus 1:

The artillerymen did yeoman service throughout the day, firing from exposed positions and, when necessary, providing their own rifle cover. They were ably supported in this time of stress by a New Zealand recruit who had come ashore firmly secured to a gun tube. This, of course, was "Siwash," the fighting, beer-drinking duck. "Siwash" volunteered for duty with the Second Division in a New Zealand bar, making application to Sergeant Dick Fagan of Illinois. The Second Division Action Report inexcusably omits the incident, but it is reliably reported that upon landing "Siwash" immediately engaged a red Japanese rooster in beak-to-beak combat. Although he drove the enemy from the field, "Siwash" was wounded and subsequently was recommended for the Purple Heart.99

The next morning, D plus 2, Lieutenant Colonel George R.E. Shell's 2d Battalion, 10th Marines began loading howitzers and men over the side into landing craft. The battalion was scheduled to join



Three 2d Marine Division leaders confer after the battle for Tarawa: left to right, BGen Thomas E. Bourke, "commanding general," 10th Marines, and


USMC Photo 63485 division artillery officer; Col Merritt A. Edson, division chief of staff; and the division commander, MajGen Julian C. Smith.

the 2d Battalion, 6th Marines on Bairiki and deliver its fire at targets on Betio. Only Battery E had been loaded when a Japanese bomber appeared overhead and the transport got underway. Battery E headed for the beach and was registering on Betio shortly after a 0630 landing. The battery's fire was adjusted by the 1st Battalion's forward observers on Betio. Since the target was between the observer and Battery E, the adjustment procedure was somewhat out of the ordinary. As Lieutenant Colonel Rixey noted, his observer adjusted Battery E's howitzers "while looking into their muzzles." This eventuality, however, "had been foreseen, planned, and rehearsed in New Zealand during regimental exercises." 100

The 2d Battalion's Battery F and H&S Battery got ashore on Bairiki by noon and were joined by Battery

D later that afternoon. Hard fighting on D plus 2 had resulted in significant gains which had virtually ensured victory. Nevertheless, the Japanese proved to be extraordinarily difficult to dislodge, and further stiff combat was anticipated before the island was secured. Then, on the night of D plus 2 and early morning of D plus 3, the Japanese "gave us very able assistance by trying to counterattack." ¹⁰¹

The first attack took place at 1930, 22 November, when about 50 enemy infiltrated to a position between two rifle companies on the 1st Battalion, 6th Marines lines. The battalion's reserve drove them away after a confused fight at close quarters. In order to disorganize future attacks before they began and to mislead the enemy as to the location of friendly positions, the 1st and 2d Battalions, 10th Marines



Shortly after Tarawa had been secured, Marine artillery officers visited Noto Mission on Bairiki. The building is the mission's church; the design on its walls are shells placed in cement. Included in the

picture are BGen Thomas E. Bourke, the regimental commander (second officer from left), and LtCol Kenneth A. Jorgensen, Commanding Officer, 4th Battalion, 10th Marines (fourth officer from left).

laid down a crossfire as close as 75 yards to the infantry lines. The artillery gradually tapered off to a steady harassing and interdiction fire. The Marines waited.

At 2300, about 50 Japanese created a diversion in front of one 6th Marines company while another 50 made a sacrificial attack on an adjacent position. The enemy was chopped up, but in the process caused the Marines to reveal their automatic weapons positions. Five hours later the enemy struck the same spot with a desperate 300-man frontal attack. The 1st Battalion, 6th Marines cut loose with a hail of small-arms fire while the 10th Marines repeated the curtain of steel close to friendly positions. Daylight revealed more than 200 dead Japanese immediately on and near the lines while another 125 artillery-shattered bodies were found farther out. The 1st Battalion, 10th Marines, alone, had fired nearly 1,500 rounds during the night.

The battle for Tarawa was over for all practical purposes. What remained was mopping up. Lieute-

nant Colonel Kenneth A. "Duke" Jorgensen landed his 4th Battalion, 10th Marines on Betio on the morning of the 23d to support the final attack on the east end of the island.* As it turned out, the 3d Battalion, 6th Marines moved so quickly against such light opposition that their fire was not needed. The artillery's 3d Battalion, still commanded by Guadalcanal veteran Lieutenant Colonel Curry, landed on Eita island, also to support the final attack. Although its fire was not needed on the 23d, the battalion received a new mission for the next day.

^{*}Earlier Gen Bourke and a small 10th Marines headquarters echelon had transferred from Bairiki to an LVT "and landed about noon of D plus 3 on Betio. Having obtained first hand information of the situation there, . . . [Bourke] selected Bairiki for the . . . command location until the entire atoll was secured." BGen Marvin H. Floom, Comments on draft MS, dtd 31Dec80.

Firing from Eita, the battalion was to support the 2d Battalion, 6th Marines clearing operation to the end of the atoll chain. The infantry advance proved to be so rapid that it soon became obvious the artillery would be unable to support from its Eita position. Accordingly, Battery G, hauling howitzers by trucks, was dispatched on the 25th to join the infantry column.

A minor skirmish on Bairiki at dusk on the 26th proved there were still enemy on the atoll. As there was only one tiny island beyond Bairiki, all hands knew the final battle on Tarawa was imminent.

The next morning the Japanese were discovered entrenched in the midst of thick, jungle growth. The lead Marine company was hard hit and the battalion commander called for an artillery concentration to cover the movement of another company to the front. The fighting that followed was at such close quarters that further fire missions were impossible. Two artillerymen were killed that day rescuing wounded infantrymen; Sergeant James L. Gerst was posthumously awarded the Navy Cross, and Private John "A" Bolthouse, Jr., the Silver Star. By nightfall it was all over. There were no more enemy left alive on the atoll of Tarawa.

The 2d Division had begun leaving Tarawa on the 24th with the artillery still attached to the various infantry regiments. The process was complete when, on 4 December, the division commander turned the shattered island over to the U.S. Navy. The conquerors of Tarawa headed for a camp of the same name on the island on Hawaii. Two days later *Time* magazine reported:

Last week some two to three thousand U.S. Marines, most of them now dead or wounded, gave the nation a name to stand beside those of Concord Bridge, the Bonhomme Richard, the Alamo, Little Big Horn, and Belleau Wood. That name was Tarawa.¹⁰²

The trip from Tarawa was a trip long to be remembered. The smell of blood, death, and disinfectant filled the stuffy transports. Each day, Marines who had succumbed to the wounds received at Tarawa slid over the side to their final resting place at the bottom of the sea. As an unneeded cap to the discomfort, most Marines found they had lost their few personal effects in the battle's confusion.

If the Marines were expecting another New Zealand-like break in the war, they were soon disappointed. The 8th Marines was the first unit to arrive at the new camp. After a one-day stopover at Pearl Harbor to unload wounded, the ships sailed 200

miles south to the port of Hilo on the big island of Hawaii. Camp Tarawa lay 65 bouncing miles away on the huge Parker cattle ranch. Situated in a saddle between the volcanoes Mauna Kea and Mauna Loa near the village of Kamuela, Camp Tarawa was a camp in name only. Streets were laid out and tents stacked in place, but nothing had been erected. The victors of Tarawa found themselves in the camp construction business.

The weather compounded the discomfort. Winter brings high winds, chilling mist, and freezing nights to the Hawaiian mountains. Snow falls on the peaks and even skiing is possible. The abrupt change in climate, although uncomfortable, did much to suppress recurrences of Guadalcanal-contracted malaria.

The 2d Division arrived at Camp Tarawa in increments during December. General Bourke, who had commanded the regiment on several occasions during the previous seven and a half years, did not accompany the 10th Marines to Hawaii. He was relieved on 9 December by Colonel Raphael Griffin. While the 10th Marines was losing an old hand, it was getting another in return; Colonel Griffin had commanded the regiment from 1938 to 1940.

December was taken up with camp construction and housekeeping chores. At the turn of the new year, though, training for the next battle began. January was spent conducting conditioning exercises and basic level training. Units were filling with replacements. Soon, training became more specialized. Fortifications and ranges were constructed.* Carrier planes practiced close support with live ordnance. In March, the division conducted amphibious exercises at Maalaea Bay on nearby Maui.

While the Marines trained hard, lived under primitive conditions, and were afforded little liberty, there were some lighter moments. When the weather turned warmer, the division staged a rodeo at Camp Tarawa. The Parker ranch supplied the bulls and the Marines supplied the bodies and suffered the bumps, the bruises, and the broken bones. A good time was had by all. World and local events

^{*}On at least one occasion the target hit was not the target intended. "One of the 10th Marines units, not mine, was on the range, and by some legerdemain (They put the supplement of the base angle in laying the battery; I realize Marine infantrymen can't comprehend these mysteries) they hit the very large wooden tank of the Parker Ranch. Until Saipan erased memories, it was pretty easy to get a Marine vs. Marine fight going by casual reference to the 10th Marines' 'Anti-Tank Battery.' "Col William P. Oliver, Jr., Comments on draft MS, dtd 1Jul80.

February 18, 1944

Rodeo Smash Hit For 10,000

Secret Agent 'Beers' All About Rodeo

Snooper-Scooper Says Modest Texans Meant To Win Everything By THE SECRET AGENT

Week's News In Review

MP's Get Only Three At Rodeo



Wild Boar Refuses To Be Greased Pig For Rodeo

Women Enlist After Tarawa

This Is My Gun And This-

New Ribbon Wins Approval Of Knox

Tenth Edges Sixth To Win Team Title

Summary Of Rodeo Events

WILD COW MILKING mer—Corp. Warren E. Lossry 10th RR No. I. Lyman, Neu with K. Sakado and J. Pa-

Dud Explosion Kills Marine

Someone Must'a Got 'Seconds'

Marine Corps Historical Collection

Marines relax after the Tarawa campaign: Front page of division newspaper at Camp Tarawa in Hawaii.



USMC Photo 73564

Marine Corporal James A. Wallace rides "Tombstone" during 2d Marine Division rodeo and barbeque at Camp Tarawa. Corporal Wallace fell off the horse but kept his cigarette in his mouth.

were covered in the whimsically named camp newspaper, *Tarawa-Boom-De-Ay*. 103

On 1 March 1944 the 3d and 5th Battalions, 10th Marines exchanged designations. One month later, the newly designated 5th Battalion was further redesignated the 2d 155mm Artillery Battalion, Corps Artillery, V Amphibious Corps, and administratively attached to the regiment. Lieutenant Colonel Floom, the former regimental operations officer, had relieved Lieutenant Colonel Curry as commander of the redesignated battalion. The 10th Marines now contained two 75mm pack howitzer battalions, 1st and 2d, two 105mm howitzer battalions, the 3d and 4th, and the 2d 155mm Artillery Battalion, VAC, armed with "the new M-1 155 howitzers, the first to be received by the Marine Corps in the Pacific." 104

Saipan

In early April, the 2d Division leaders learned the name of the division's new target. D-Day for the invasion of Saipan in the Marianas was set for 15 June. Once Saipan was secured, the nearby island of Tinian would follow. Two divisions were to land abreast; the 2d on the left and the 4th on the right, with the Army's 27th Infantry Division as Expeditionary Troops reserve.


Saipan has been described as being shaped like a monkey wrench with Marpi Point in the north as the end of the handle and Magicienne Bay in the east as the opening between the two jaws. Semicircular Tinian, four miles to the south, could be likened to a blob of grease dripping from the wrench.

The two assault combat teams (CT) in the 2d Division, CT 6 and CT 8, and their supporting 10th Marines artillery were assigned to 22 tank landing ships (LSTs). Plenty of amphibian tractors were available. Tarawa had demonstrated their worth as assault vehicles beyond any doubt. Included in the LST loads were armored amphibian tractors, LVT (A) 4s. The division staff, division troops, and the division reserve (CT 2) were assigned to larger amphibious ships. 105

After final rehearsals at Maalea Bay and Kahoolawe Island, the task force put in at Pearl Harbor for last-minute staging and refit. The slower LSTs got underway on 26 May while the faster transports followed five days later. On 9 June, the last ship carrying 2d Division Marines rendezvoused in newly-captured Eniwetok lagoon. The 2d Division did not linger; the task force cleared the lagoon on 11 June.

Saipan was defended by an estimated force of more than 30,000 Japanese soldiers and sailors. While the island commander planned to smash the invasion on the beach, he also attempted to set up a complete defense in depth. Although shortages of time, engineer troops, and material prevented completion of the total defense plan, the Japanese did manage to prepare many formidable inland positions.

The day the assault troops left Eniwetok lagoon, Vice Admiral Marc A. Mitscher's Task Force 58 began the preparatory bombardment of Saipan. First, warplanes from 16 aircraft carriers hit the island. The next day, bombers began a two-day blitz. On the 13th, Admiral Mitscher's fast battleships delivered a long-range bombardment. On the 14th the naval guns began working in earnest. Seven old battleships, 11 cruisers, and 23 destroyers moved in for the close, heavy, observed, methodical fire deemed necessary as a result of Tarawa. As at Tarawa, naval gunfire did not demolish all of the enemy defenses, though its quality was improving.



Throughout the war the Marines would continue to fight for longer and longer preliminary bombardments.

As two battleships, a cruiser, and four destroyers shelled the Saipan coast from Garapan to Marpi Point, the transports carrying CT 2 began swinging landing craft into the water off Tanapag Harbor. None of the division reserve was disembarked. The move was a demonstration, calculated to cause the Japanese to reinforce the area, drawing troops from their reserves or away from the actual assault beaches. The Japanese were not fooled.

At 0812, 15 June the first wave of LVTs roared toward the beach from 5,500 yards offshore. Friendly supporting arms fire reached and maintained a crescendo. Among the ships present that day was the venerable battleship USS *California* (BB 44), resurrected from her muddy berth at the bottom of Pearl Harbor and firing with a vengeance. Warships hammered the beaches until the Marines were within 300 yards of land. Carrier aircraft moved a curtain of rockets, bombs, and strafing fire 100 yards in advance of the first wave as it crossed the beach. 106

The Japanese were not idle. Once the lead LVTs ground over the reef, they were brought under increasingly heavier and more accurate large caliber fire. At 0843, the lead elements of the 2d Division were ashore. The essence of the battle shifted from the sea and air to the land, and:

Now once again it was the Marine—the Marine who had fought at Guadalcanal, or at Tarawa, or only in the sham battles of training—against the stubby, tape-putteed little Japanese soldier whose philosophy of battle did not admit the possibility of surrender but only glorious victory or glorious death.¹⁰⁷

Once ashore, the Marine divisions were to push inland and seize the high ground running from Hill 410 south to Agingan Point. Once this objective was secure, the 4th Division was to continue east and seize Aslito airfield and Nafutan Point. The 2d Division was to drive to Magicienne Bay and then attack north to Marpi Point.

A stubbornly fought Japanese antiboat gun on Afetna Point coupled with a northward current drove the 2d Division waves farther to the left than planned. This unintentional massing of troops contributed to high D-Day casualty figures. The 8th Marines units were forced to struggle back to the right (south) after landing.

The 6th Marines found the going on Red Beach very slow and costly. In the first four hours, Colonel James P. Riseley's regiment suffered 35 percent

casualties. Colonel Clarence R. Wallace's 8th Marines, landing nominally over Green Beach, were able to make more distance inland, but suffered roughly the same number of casualties. Both regiments landed their reserve battalions around 1000. By the afternoon, the 8th Marines had crossed the airstrip in their zone and reached the swamps west of Lake Susupe. The division reserve, CT 2, had been landed over Red Beach to reinforce the 6th Marines.

At 1615, the 1st Battalion, 10th Marines, embarked in 15 LVT-4s, landed and went into positions to the rear of the 6th Marines, 50 to 150 yards in from Red Beach 2. The 2d Battalion, 10th Marines followed in short order, crossed the Charan Kanoa airstrip, and went into action in support of the 8th Marines. Colonel Griffin landed at 1730 and set up his command post just in from Red Beach 2 near the division command post. The 10th Marines' 105mm howitzer battalions remained on board ship for the night. 108

The first day on Saipan had cost the 2d Division 238 killed and 1,022 wounded; 315 were still missing at nightfall. The day's objective, the high ground, was still in Japanese hands. During the night, the Japanese launched two heavy attacks against the 6th Marines. The first, around 2200, was a combined tank-infantry attack. It was broken up by heavy small arms fire from the frontlines. The California's secondary batteries caught the survivors in a hail of 5-inch and 3-inch fire. The enemy renewed his pressure on the 6th Marines' lines in the early morning hours of 16 June, but was finally driven off by a platoon of medium tanks and the survivors punished by the 1st Battalion, 10th Marines' howitzers. More than 700 Japanese had died in front of the 6th Marines during the night. On the right, the 8th Marines was subjected to much lighter and more disorganized attacks. The 2d Battalion, 10th Marines' 75mm pack howitzers helped break up these small-scale probes.

D plus 1 on Saipan was a day of modest gains, consolidation of terrain already captured, and strengthening of the beachhead. The 2d Battalion, 8th Marines drove the enemy from Afetna Point and linked up with the 4th Division's 23d Marines. During the day the 1st Battalion, 10th Marines engaged in several sharp engagements with the enemy's artillery. At 0805 the enemy began shelling the battalion's area with weapons of 105mm or larger. Battery B was hit by three rounds at 0810 and one section was put out of action. The battery displaced to its alternate position and was registered and ready to

fire by 1603. Meanwhile, Batteries A and B fired counter battery missions. Although hit by an enemy round which caused six casualties during D plus 1, Battery A managed to destroy two pillboxes, one dual-purpose antiaircraft position, and three other targets.

In the afternoon, DUKWs from the 2d Amphibian Truck Company carried the men and the 105mm howitzers of the 3d and 4th Battalions, 10th Marines ashore over Green Beach 3.* The 4th Battalion emplaced near the radio station while the 3d Battalion occupied a position 200 yards in from the beach. The Japanese, still occupying the heights, continued accurate shelling of the low-lying coastal strip. During the day, the artillery's 4th Battalion lost many killed including a battery commander and the battalion's intelligence officer. 109**

Colonel Jorgensen described the 4th Battalion's predicament:

When the 4th Battalion landed, the beach areas and inland were very crowded; it was difficult to find battery positions. We were able to find fair positions with some concealment for two batteries, but Battery K we were forced to put in the open. Everyone was instructed to dig in and keep on digging and sandbagging to get the howitzers and personnel some protection. From Mt. Tapotchau the Japanese were looking right down our throats and we started getting artillery shells in our positions immediately. They kept it up until the high ground was taken. 110



USMC Photo 82555

A brief interlude in the battle for Saipan. A Marine gun crew of a hastily camouflaged 105mm howitzer takes time out to relax and eat during the campaign.

The Japanese commander on Saipan, Lieutenant General Yoshitsugu Saito, decided to use the early morning hours of D plus 2 for the counterattack which he hoped would drive the invaders into the sea. Once again the 6th Marines bore the brunt of the attack. At 0330 on 17 June, the 1st Battalion, 6th Marines heard the rumble of many tracked vehicles heading toward its lines. Fifteen minutes later, a Japanese force of 44 tanks and hundreds of supporting infantry struck. In a theater of war not noted for tank attacks, this was an impressive force. Major James A. Donovan, Jr., executive officer of the 1st Battalion, 6th Marines, later wrote:

The battle evolved itself into a mad house of noise, tracers, and flashing lights. As tanks were hit and set afire, they silhouetted other tanks coming out of the flickering shadows to the front or already on top of the squads.¹¹¹

In the 75 minutes between 0300 and 0415, the 1st Battalion, 10th Marines brought 800 rounds crashing down on the enemy in front of the 6th Marines and was credited with destroying five Japanese tanks. The 75mm pack howitzers were joined by 105mm fire from the 4th Battalion's Battery M. Japanese artillery also joined the battle. All dur-

^{*}Col Oliver, then commanding the 4th Battalion's Battery M, recalled, "The DUKW's, with 105's on board, were loaded to the gunwales; only 6"-7" freeboard. They carried skeleton gun crews and no more than six or eight rounds of ammunition per gun DUKW. Additional ammunition was carried in ammunition DUKW's. Because of the miniscule freeboard we had to land through the harbor mouth of Charon Kanoa, both sides of which were marked with Japanese range flags. As the 4th Battalion, 10th Marines moved toward the very narrow passage with LtCol Harry Shea, the battalion executive officer, in the lead LVT, the Japanese put down intense artillery fire across the channel; splashes so high it looked from up close like Niagara Falls. A naval officer from the beach party in my DUKW said, 'Isn't our naval gunfire a little short?' I grinned and said it was being provided by the other side. All on board laughed and the rather understandable tension went away for a while. For some reason the Japanese barrage ended just as we began our passage through the range flags, and we all got ashore." Col William P. Oliver, Jr., Comments on draft MS, dtd 1Jul80.

^{**}BGen Floom remembered that according to the original plans his 2d 155mm Howitzer Battalion was to be in support of the 10th Marines, but on D plus 2 his battalion was attached to the 14th Marines and landed in the 4th Division sector. His battalion provided "general support of the Landing Force." BGen Marvin H. Floom, Comments on draft MS, dtd 31Dec80.

ing the previous day it had carefully marked the positions of the Marine howitzers. In the ensuing Japanese fire, five 4th Battalion 105mm howitzers and three 2d Battalion 75mm pack howitzers were disabled. The 2d Battalion's commander, Lieutenant Colonel Shell was wounded and evacuated. The Japanese lost 31 tanks and 300 troops in the night's engagement.¹¹²

The Japanese had been spurred on by reports that the Imperial Fleet was on the way to destroy the American fleet and relieve the island's garrison. The U.S. Fifth Fleet commander, Vice Admiral Raymond A. Spruance, decided to establish a surface and air screen in an arc west of Guam and Saipan. The on-coming Japanese force, led by Vice Admiral Jisaburo Ozawa, was formidable: 79 warships including 9 aircraft carriers, 22 submarines, and 5 battleships; among them was the world's largest battleship, the 18-inch gunned Yamato. 113

The Battle of the Philippine Sea, beginning on 18 June, was a Japanese tragedy which sealed Saipan's fate and further decimated Japan's naval air force. The highlight of the battle came on the 19th when Admiral Mitscher's flyers caught the in-coming

Japanese aviators in what was dubbed the "Great Marianas Turkey Shoot." All told, the Battle of the Philippine Sea cost the Japanese 476 aircraft and 23 ships.

On the 17th, the 2d Division nearly doubled its beachhead, and the Army's 27th Infantry Division was landed to sweep through Aslito airfield and occupy the southern end of Saipan. This would free the 4th Division to drive to Magicienne Bay and then wheel to the left alongside the 2d Division. That evening the Japanese tried an amphibious envelopment, sending 35 landing craft south from Tanapag Harbor. This move had been anticipated and the Marine trap was sprung. Armored amphibian tractors, warships cruising outside the reef, and howitzers from the 1st and 4th Battalions, 10th Marines caught the Japanese in a murderous crossfire. Thirteen landing craft went down. The survivors who attempted to swim ashore were dealt with by Marine riflemen and artillery airbursts. 114

On 19 June Japanese were reported in a swamp about 400 yards from the 4th Battalion, 10th Marines position. A patrol from H&S Battery was sent in to deal with them. In the exchange of

Marine 75mm pack howitzer provides direct fire support during the Saipan campaign. The "75" continued to prove its utility despite the addition of heavier guns to the inventory during the war.

USMC Photo 84394



machine gun fire and hand grenades which followed, seven Japanese were killed and two machine guns captured. The guns were carried out of the swamp and included in the battalion's defensive positions.

The same day, Battery B's pack 75s destroyed an enemy field piece and an oil dump. The next day, Battery C, although it had two sections temporarily out of action due to enemy artillery fire, managed to destroy one field piece, two tanks, and an enemy ammunition dump.

The Japanese were busy again on the night of 21-22 June. An infiltrator managed to blow up a 2d Division ammunition dump set up on Green Beach. A sentry from the 2d Battalion, 10th Marines spotted the infiltrator too late to prevent an explosion and fire in the small arms portion of the dump. The battalion's supply section immediately moved to isolate the fire, but while it was occupied in this risky business, a second explosion occurred in another section of the dump. The entire group was killed, save two. The dump continued burning and exploding through the night.¹¹⁵

The terrain of central Saipan was a nightmare of misshapen rock. The dominating piece of terrain encountered in the drive north was Mt. Tapotchau. On the 22d, D plus 7, the 2d Division was poised to take it. In an amazing combination of incredible luck and daring, the peak was won on the 25th. Lieutenant Colonel Rathvon McC. Tompkins, commander of the 1st Battalion, 29th Marines which was attached to the 8th Marines, led a 22-man patrol to the top of Tapotchau and found it unoccupied. Tompkins left the patrol on top, hurried down alone to his battalion, and led it back up single file, arriving in time to turn back, with the help of 1st Battalion, 10th Marines' fire, a midnight Japanese counterattack.

Colonel Griffin's regimental command post (CP) and fire direction center (FDC) near the northern end of the Charan Kanoa airstrip came under fire from a Japanese battery of undetermined caliber on the night of 23-24 June. Approximately 13 threegun salvos hammered into the CP area. The regiment's executive officer and its former commander, Lieutenant Colonel Forsyth was killed, as were the regimental sergeant major, David H. Baker, and operations chief, Staff Sergeant Henry F. Michaelski. The physical damage to the FDC required that 1st Battalion, 10th Marines temporarily take over the regiment's fire control. Later in the day, Colonel Rixey moved over from the 1st Battalion to assume the duties of regimental executive officer. 116

"The Valley of Hell," "Purple Heart Ridge," "Hells Pocket," and "Death Valley"—these were the names given to Saipan's features by those who fought across them. By the 1st of July, the 2d Marines were on the outskirts of Garapan. American forces were spread out on a line east from Garapan, with the 27th Infantry Division between the two Marine divisions. The next morning the Marines entered the city; the first to fall to American forces in the Pacific. The enemy counterattacked in the afternoon, but was beaten off.

General Holland M. Smith planned to swing the corps attack to the northwest, thereby pinching the 2d Marine Division out of the battle. This would leave the 4th Marine Division on the right and the 27th Infantry Division on the left to handle the rest of Saipan. The 2d Division had suffered 4,488 casualties since D-Day and badly needed replacements and reorganization. General Smith wanted to rest the division before invading Tinian.¹¹⁷

On the 4th of July, the 2d Division was pinched out and the other two divisions pressed on. The 3d and 4th Battalions, 10th Marines were attached to the 4th Division to lend their 105mm fire to the 23d Marines. The end was literally in sight. Marpi Point lay 9,000 yards away. The remaining Japanese were being compressed in the northern end of Saipan. The corps commander warned his units to guard against a final banzai attack.

That very thing happened. General Saito, sick, wounded, and burning with shame for having failed his Emperor, exhorted his men to kill seven Americans each before dying, and then, this done, he dined on crabmeat and sake and committed harakiri. At 0400, 7 July, the remaining Japanese on Saipan, the indiscriminately mixed remnants of units, headed south, bent on obeying their dead general's edict.

In their path were two battalions of the 27th Infantry Division, the 1st and 2d Battalions, 105th Infantry. These two battalions, unfortunately, had not tied in well the night before. A 300-yard gap lay between them. Preceded by a murderous mortar barrage, the Japanese struck. By 0635, both battalions were overrun; 406 soldiers were killed and 512 wounded. Part of the Japanese force had already boiled through the gap and continued south.

The next unit the desperate Japanese encountered was the 3d Battalion, 10th Marines, 1,200 yards to the rear of the Army positions. The battalion, still attached to the 4th Division, was set up in echelon



Saipan's desolate terrain serves as a backdrop to this DUKW-towed 105mm howitzer. The DUKWs not

only served as amphibious carriers but as prime movers of artillery pieces and ammunition on land.

right with Battery H forward and the battalion FDC 50 yards to its rear. Next in line was Battery I followed by Battery G on higher ground. At about 0515, the Japanese attacked with 500 troops supported by tanks. While Battery H could bring its 105mm howitzers to bear, it masked the other batteries' fire.

The cannoneers cut their fuzes at four-tenths of a second. The Japanese were that close. Shells exploded 50 yards from the muzzles. To save the time necessary to set fuzes, some howitzers were depressed to produce ricochet fire. There was no fancy laying of the piece involved. In this action the ammunition handlers and loaders were kings. The Japanese were all around the lead two batteries of the 3d Battalion. At one point early in the fight, a Battery H howitzer was spun to the rear to engage and destroy a Japanese tank at a range of 50 yards. Finally, at 0700, casualties from machine gun and rifle fire had reduced Battery H strength to the point that it could no longer work its guns. Survivors fell back to defensive positions in an old Japanese machinery dump 150 yards to the rear.

Battery I meanwhile had been under a series of Japanese attacks since 0455. Unable to fire their howitzers because of Battery H to the front, the artillerymen blazed away with small arms. After two hours of fighting as infantrymen, the cannoneers ran out of ammunition. The battery commander, Captain John M. Allen, coolly ordered the howitzers' fir-

ing locks removed and with his men fell back to the Battery G position where the combined batteries held out until relieved later in the day.

Especially hard hit were the H&S Battery personnel manning the FDC and aid station behind Battery H. The Marines there retired only after close, hard fighting and numerous casualties. Among those who died that morning was the battalion commander, Major William L. Crouch, killed by rifle fire.

A fringe of the surging Japanese banzai charge swept against 4th Battalion, 10th Marines. The battalion killed 85 enemy in front of and in its lines. Foremost among the bravery displayed by the artillerymen that morning was that of Private First Class Harold C. Angerholm, 4th Battalion, 10th Marines. The citation for the 19-year-old's Medal of Honor reads in part:

... on Saipan, Marianas Islands, 7 July 1944. When the enemy launched a fierce, determined counterattack against our positions and overran a neighboring artillery battalion, Private First Class Angerholm immediately volunteered to assist in the efforts to check the hostile attack and evacuate our wounded. Locating and appropriating an abandoned ambulance jeep, he repeatedly made extremely perilous trips under heavy rifle and mortar fire and single-handedly loaded and evacuated approximately 45 casualties, working tirelessly and with utter disregard for his own safety during a gruelling period of more than 3 hours. Despite intense, persistent enemy fire,

he ran out to aid two men he believed to be wounded Marines but was himself mortally wounded by a Japanese sniper while carrying out his hazardous mission.

At 1000, a counterattack by two battalions of the Army's 106th Infantry was underway. By 1800 most of the lost ground had been recaptured. When the battle was over, the 3d Battalion, 10th Marines had lost 45 dead and 82 wounded. The two battalions of the first-hit 105th Infantry had taken 918 casualties, but the Japanese had paid the highest price. More than 4,300 had given their blood for the Emperor, 322 of these had died in front of the howitzers and rifles of the 3d Battalion, 10th Marines. In recognition of its gallant fight, Secretary of the Navy James V. Forrestal awarded the battalion the Navy Unit Commendation. 118

The next day, 8 July, the 2d Division passed through the 27th Infantry Division and, alongside the 4th Division, continued the drive on Marpi Point. The island was declared "secure" on 9 July. This was a subjective call; Japanese were still being killed months later. In fact, on 13 July, the 3d Battalion, 6th Marines assaulted tiny Maniagassa Island in Tanapag harbor. In the 15 minutes prior to their landing, the 10th Marines put 900 105mm and 720 75mm shells on target. Since the island was only 250 yards wide and 300 yards long, it is safe to presume the objective was nicely saturated. In an hour Maniagassa was secured at the cost of one Marine wounded. 119

Saipan cost the United States 3,100 dead, 13,099 wounded, and 326 missing. Japanese dead were reported as 23,811. Among these was Vice Admiral Chiuchi Nagumo, leader of the attack on Pearl Harbor, who committed suicide in a Saipan cave. General Holland M. Smith considered Saipan the decisive battle in the Pacific. General Saito agreed with him. After Saipan the Japanese no longer had an effective carrier air force, while the United States could bomb Japan with land-based aircraft, and the distance U.S. submarines had to travel to hunt the Japanese waters was cut in half.

The Japanese fought their usual fight. The author of the official Marine Corps monograph Saipan wrote:

... the enemy was brought to his knees. But on his knees he fought. And the Japanese fought well in this, or any other, position. Whenever men of various parts of the world are compared in fighting tenacity, the men of Japan must rate among the best. 120

Saipan's 40,000 dead and wounded bore witness to this assessment.


The Japanese had learned some lessons from Saipan. Among these was an appreciation for a defense in depth. Marines in future battles for Peleliu, Iwo Jima, and Okinawa would swear they had learned the lesson well. The Japanese, however, did not have time to implement their new-found defensive knowledge before the next battle. Only five days after the Saipan landings, the Army's 531st Field Artillery had unleashed its 155mm guns, the "Long Toms," on the blob of grease at the end of the Saipan monkey wrench.

Tinian - The Perfect One

Had the V Amphibious Corps been opposed by a western foe on Tinian, the battle might never have been fought. Surrounded by an enemy fleet, smothered by enemy air forces, and separated from three victorious infantry divisions by only four miles, a force of only 9,000 men would have surrendered. However, what the Japanese thought of surrender had been amply demonstrated.

Tinian's topography was markedly different from Saipan's. Instead of rugged mountains, Tinian was flat and open in the center with moderate peaks in the north and south. The island is ringed by a cliff from six to 100 feet high, broken in only three places. The first was in front of Tinian Town in the south, an obvious landing site and heavily defended. The second, on the east coast in the center of Asiga Bay, boasted numerous pill boxes, moored mines, and other heavy defenses. The third site was on the northwest end of the island. There two narrow beaches with a combined width of only 220 yards were separated by 1,000 yards of coral outcroppings. The idea of landing division-sized units over such narrow frontages appeared preposterous at first glance. Gambling that the Japanese shared this assessment, the decision was made to use the northwest site, White Beaches 1 and 2.

Tinian has been called the perfect amphibious operation in the Pacific war. Compared to Saipan's toll of 92 killed, 221 wounded, and 4 missing for the 10th Marines, Tinian cost the regiment two killed and seven wounded. Tinian was unlike any battle before or after. The two Marine divisions to be used had just finished a grueling, 24-day campaign and were near exhaustion; it had to be a quick campaign. The 4th Marine Division was to land over White



Beaches 1 and 2 with two regiments abreast and one in reserve. The 2d Division would land on order.

Artillery employment for the Tinian operation was unique. Nearly 25,000 artillery rounds were fired at Tinian from Saipan from 9 to 23 July, over a round a minute each day. A feature of General Julian C. Smith's plan for the seizure of Tarawa, bombardment of one island from another by landbased artillery, had been dusted off, reexamined, and implemented. The 13 Army and Marine firing battalions on Saipan of 105mm caliber or greater were formed into three groupments under Army Brigadier General Arthur M. Harper.* The 105mm battalions from the 10th and 14th Marines together with the 4th VAC 105mm howitzer battalion comprised Groupment A under Colonel Griffin. All groupments were moved to southern Saipan and began a steady, highly methodical bombardment. 121

The invasion of Tinian was the only Pacific invasion in which a division's artillery hit the beach before its infantry. The 75mm pack howitzer battalions of the 10th Marines were assigned an assault role with the 4th Division. The 1st and 2d Battalions, 10th Marines found themselves ashore and firing more than four hours before the 1st Battalion, 8th Marines arrived as the vanguard of the 2d Division.

Elaborate plans were laid to deceive the Japanese as to the true landing site. General Harper was careful not to give the White Beaches a suspiciously heavy preparatory bombardment. Naval gunfire ships gave Tinian Town an especially heavy dosage of large caliber high explosive. On the morning of 24 July (called J-Day, to avoid confusion with Saipan's D-Day and Guam's W-Day), the Japanese at Tinian Town were treated to one of the more realistic demonstrations of the Pacific war. A battleship, a cruiser, and four destroyers moved in close for a heavy prelanding shelling. The 2d and 8th Marines clambered down nets to landing craft. The craft milled around for a while and then, at 0730, headed for the beach. The Japanese opened fire, revealing many gun positions. None of the landing craft were hit, but two ships in the bombardment force were heavily damaged by a three-gun, 6-inch battery before it was silenced. The landing craft turned



USMC Photo 87645

Marine artillery arrives on Tinian. A Marine gun crew unloads 75mm pack howitzer from the DUKW which brought them and the weapon ashore.

around when 2,000 yards from shore and returned to the transports.

On White Beaches 1 and 2, meanwhile, the actual landing was proceeding smoothly against light resistance. Because of the narrowness of the beaches, all troops and equipment landed had to clear the beach immediately. No beach dump buildup was possible. The four pack howitzer battalions from the 10th and 14th Marines had been assigned one LST each with all weapons and equipment preloaded in DUKWs. These amphibian trucks took the 75mm pack howitzers and crews directly from tank deck to firing position. By 1843, both 10th Marines battalions were ashore reinforcing the fires of the two 14th Marines battalions. 122

Early the next morning the Japanese launched three major counterattacks. All three were defeated by a hail of fire from all weapons which could be brought to bear. During one of the attacks, the men of Battery D, 2d Battalion, 14th Marines waged a

^{*}A 14th Battalion, LtCol Floom's 2d 155mm Howitzer Battalion, VAC, had been reembarked to participate in the invasion of Guam. BGen Marvin H. Floom, Comments on draft MS, dtd 31Dec80.

fight similar to that of the 3d Battalion, 10th Marines on Saipan. The artillerymen killed nearly 100 Japanese at close quarters while continuing to fire a mission for the 24th Marines. The series of night attacks cost the Japanese 1,241 men, one-seventh of the island's defenders. The Marines hoped for more nights like the one of J-Day. 123

On the 26th, J plus 2, the 1st and 2d Battalions, 10th Marines reverted to 2d Division control. The two Marine divisions were pushing south, the 4th Division on the right and the 2d Division on the left. With the rapid southward movement of the U.S. forces on Tinian, it became obvious that the Marine 105mm battalions based on Saipan would have to displace by landing craft across the channel. Accordingly, on the 27th, the 10th Marines was reunited when the 3d and 4th Battalions crossed and Colonel Griffin set up his command post and assumed control just prior to 1600. For most of the remaining fighting on Tinian, the 1st, 2d, and 3d Battalions

This field howitzer, nicknamed "Miss Connie," is shown firing into a Japanese-held cave from the brink of a sheer cliff on Tinian. The gun was locked fired in direct support of the 2d, 8th, and 6th Marines respectively. The 4th Battalion was in general support of the 2d Division.¹²⁴

Several days after the landing, an aerial observer (AO) reported an enemy tank at a crossroads 6,500 yards to the front. Checking the map, the 4th Battalion, 10th Marines discovered that the unfortunate tank's position coincided with a battalion registration base point. One volley of eight howitzers was fired; one tank was destroyed. 125

On the 30th of July, the 24th Marines entered Tinian Town, a mass of rubble with streets indistinguishable from buildings. Only one briefly alive enemy soldier was found.

After a difficult and dangerous climb, the 8th Marines managed to get on top of the plateau at the southern end of Tinian and hang on through the night of the 31st. Marines and Japanese fought at close range in the pitch dark. Marine mortars and artillery worked constantly. The 10th Marines fired

securely in this unusual position after parts were hand-carried to the cliff's edge. "Miss Connie" was a veteran of Guadalcanal, Saipan, and Tinian.

USMC Photo 94660

